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Exchange Rate Regimes, Capital Flows, 
and Crisis Prevention
1.1.1 Introduction
The emerging markets’ financial crises of the 1990s had remarkable sim-
ilarities.1 Attracted by high domestic interest rates, a sense of stability stem-
ming from rigid exchange rates, and what at the time appeared to be rosy
prospects, large volumes of foreign portfolio funds moved into Latin Amer-
ica, East Asia, and Russia. This helped to propel stock market booms and
to finance large current account deficits. At some point, and for a number
of reasons, these funds slowed down or were reversed. This change in con-
ditions required significant corrections in macroeconomics policies. Invari-
ably, however, adjustment was delayed or was insuﬃcient, increasing the
level of uncertainty and the degree of country risk. As a result, massive vol-
umes of capital left the country in question, international reserves dropped
to dangerously low levels, and real exchange rates became acutely overval-
ued. Eventually the pegged nominal exchange rate had to be abandoned,
and the country was forced to float its currency. In some cases—Brazil and
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Russia are the clearest examples—a severe fiscal imbalance made the situ-
ation even worse.
Recent currency crises have tended to be deeper than in the past, result-
ing in steep costs to the population of the countries involved. In a world
with high capital mobility, even small adjustments in international portfo-
lio allocations to the emerging economies result in very large swings in cap-
ital flows. Sudden reductions in these flows, in turn, amplify exchange rate
or interest rate adjustments and generate overshooting, further bruising
credibility and unleashing a vicious circle. Two main policy issues have been
emphasized in recent discussions on crisis prevention: First, an increasing
number of authors have argued that in order to prevent crises, there is a
need to introduce major changes to exchange rate practices in emerging
economies. According to this view, emerging economies should adopt
“credible” exchange rate regimes. A “credible” regime would reduce the
probability of rumors-based reversals in capital flows, including what some
authors have called have called “sudden stops.” These authors have pointed
out that the emerging economies should follow a “two-corners” approach
to exchange rate policy: they should either adopt a freely floating regime or
a super-fixed exchange rate system (Summers 2000). Second, a number of
analysts have argued that the imposition of capital controls—and in par-
ticular controls on capital inflows—provides an eﬀective way to reduce the
probability of a currency crisis.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze, within the context of the imple-
mentation of a new financial architecture, the relationship between ex-
change rate regimes, capital flows, and currency crises in emerging econ-
omies. The paper draws on lessons learned during the 1990s and deals with
some of the most important policy controversies that emerged after the Mex-
ican, East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises. I also evaluate some recent
proposals for reforming the international financial architecture that have
emphasized exchange rate regimes and capital mobility. The rest of the pa-
per is organized as follows: In section 1.1.2 I review the way in which econ-
omists’ thinking about exchange rates in emerging markets has changed in
the last decade and a half. More specifically, in this section I deal with four
interrelated issues: (a) the role of nominal exchange rates as nominal an-
chors; (b) the costs of real exchange rate overvaluation; (c) strategies for ex-
iting a pegged exchange rate; and (d) the death of middle-of-the-road ex-
change rate regimes as policy options. In section 1.1.3 I deal with capital
controls as a crisis prevention device. In this section Chile’s experience with
market-based controls on capital inflows is discussed in some detail. Section
1.1.4 focuses on the currently fashionable view that suggests that emerging
countries should freely float or adopt a super-fixed exchange rate regime
(i.e., currency board or dollarization). In doing this I analyze whether
emerging markets can adopt a truly freely floating exchange rate system, or
whether, as argued by some analysts, a true floating system is not feasible in
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less advanced nations. The experiences of Panama and Argentina with su-
per-fixity, and of Mexico with a floating rate, are discussed in some detail.
Finally, section 1.1.5 contains some concluding remarks.
1.1.2 Exchange Rate Lessons from the 1990s Currency Crises
The currency crises of the 1990s have led economists to rethink their
views on exchange rate policies in emerging countries. Specifically, these
crises have led many economists to question the merits of pegged-but-
adjustable exchange rates, both in the short run—that is, during a stabi-
lization program—and in the longer run. Indeed, the increasingly domi-
nant view among experts is that, in order to prevent the recurrence of
financial and currency crises, most emerging countries should adopt either
freely floating or super-fixed exchange rate regimes. In this section I discuss
the way in which policy thinking on exchange rates in emerging countries
has evolved in the last decade and a half or so.
Nominal Anchors and Exchange Rates
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, and after a period of relative disfavor, rigid
nominal exchange rates made a comeback in policy and academic circles.
Based on time-consistency and political economy arguments, a number of
authors argued that fixed, or predetermined, nominal exchange rates pro-
vided an eﬀective device for guiding a disinflation program and for main-
taining macroeconomic stability. According to this view, an exchange rate
anchor was particularly eﬀective in countries with high inflation—say, high
two-digit levels—that had already tackled (most of) their fiscal imbalances.
By imposing a ceiling on tradable prices, and by guiding inflationary ex-
pectations, it was said, an exchange rate nominal anchor would rapidly gen-
erate a convergence between the country’s and the international rates of in-
flation. This view was particularly popular in Latin America and was
behind major stabilization eﬀorts in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, among
other countries. According to this perspective, a prerequisite for a success-
ful exchange rate–based stabilization program was that the country in ques-
tion had put its public finances in order before the program was imple-
mented in full. This, indeed, had been the case in Chile in 1978–79 and
Mexico during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the so-called Pacto de
Solidaridad exchange rate–based stabilization program was implemented
(see Edwards and Edwards 1991; Aspe 1993).
However, a recurrent problem with exchange rate–based stabilization
programs—and one that was not fully anticipated by its supporters—was
that inflation tended to have a considerable degree of inertia. That is, in
most episodes, domestic prices and wages continued to increase even after
the nominal exchange rate had been fixed. In Edwards (1998c) I used data
from the Chilean (1977–82) and Mexican (1988–94) exchange rate–based
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stabilizations to analyze whether the degree inflationary persistence de-
clined once the nominal exchange rate anchor program was implemented.
My results suggest that, in both cases, the degree of persistence did not
change significantly and remained very high. I attributed these results to
two factors: a rather low degree of credibility of the programs, and, partic-
ularly in the case of Chile, the eﬀects of a backward-looking wage-rate in-
dexation mechanism.
If inflation is indeed characterized by a high degree of inertia, a fixed—
or predetermined—nominal exchange rate will result in a real exchange rate
appreciation and consequently in a decline in exports’ competitiveness.
Dornbusch (1997, 131) forcefully discussed the dangers of exchange rate
anchors in his analysis of the Mexican crisis:
Exchange rate–based stabilization goes through three phases: The first
one is very useful . . . [E]xchange rate stabilization helps bring under way
a stabilization . . . In the second phase increasing real appreciation be-
comes apparent, it is increasingly recognized, but it is inconvenient to do
something . . . Finally, in the third phase, it is too late to do something.
Real appreciation has come to a point where a major devaluation is nec-
essary. But the politics will not allow that. Some more time is spent in
denial, and then—sometime—enough bad news pile[s] up to cause the
crash.
An additional complication is that under pegged exchange rates, negative
external shocks tend to generate a costly adjustment process. Indeed, in a
country with fixed exchange rates the optimal reaction to a negative
shock—a worsening of the terms of trade or a decline in capital inflows, for
example—is tightening monetary and fiscal policies until external balance
is reestablished. A direct consequence of this is that, as a result of these neg-
ative shocks, economic activity will decline, and the rate of unemployment
will tend to increase sharply. If the country is already suﬀering from a real
exchange rate overvaluation, this kind of adjustment becomes politically
diﬃcult. More often than not, countries that face this situation will tend to
postpone the required macroeconomics tightening, increasing the degree of
vulnerability of the economy. Following this kind of reasoning, and after re-
viewing the fundamental aspects of the Mexican crisis, Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco (1995, 71) argue that it is “hard to find cases where governments
have let the [adjustment process under fixed exchange rate] run its course.”
According to them, countries’ political inability (or unwillingness) to live
according to the rules of a fixed exchange rate regime reduces its degree of
credibility.
In the mid-1990s, even as professional economists in academia and the
multilateral institutions questioned the eﬀectiveness of pegged-but-
adjustable rates, policymakers in the emerging economies continued to fa-
vor that type of policies. In spite of Mexico’s painful experience with a rigid
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exchange rate regime in the first half of the 1990s, the five East Asian na-
tions that eventually ran into a crisis in 1997 had a rigid—de facto, pegged,
or quasi pegged—exchange rate system with respect to the U.S. dollar. Al-
though this system worked relatively well while the U.S. dollar was relatively
weak in international currency markets, things turned to the worse when,
starting in mid-1996, the dollar began to strengthen relative to the Japanese
yen. Naturally, as the dollar appreciated relative to the yen, so did those cur-
rencies pegged to it. Ito (2000, 280) has described the role of pegged ex-
change rates in the East Asian crisis in the following way:
[T]he exchange rate regime was de facto dollar pegged. In the period of
yen appreciation, Asian exporters enjoy high growth contributing to an
overall high, economic growth, while in the period of yen depreciation,
Asian economies’ performance becomes less impressive . . . Moreover,
the dollar peg with high interest rates invited in short-term portfolio in-
vestment. Investors and borrowers mistook the stability of the exchange
rate for the absence of exchange rate risk.
In Russia and Brazil the reliance on rigid exchange rates was even more
risky than in Mexico and in the East Asian nations. This was because in
both Russia and Brazil the public-sector accounts were clearly out of con-
trol. In Russia, for example, the nominal deficit averaged 7.4 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) during the three years preceding the crisis.
Worse yet, the lack of accountability during the privatization process, and
the perception of massive corruption, had made international investors
particularly skittish. In Brazil, the real plan, launched in 1994, relied on a
very slowly moving preannounced parity with respect to the U.S. dollar. In
spite of repeated eﬀorts, the authorities were unable to rein in a very large
fiscal imbalance. By late 1998 the nation’s consolidated nominal fiscal
deficit exceeded the astonishing level of 8 percent of GDP.
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation: How Dangerous? 
How to Measure It?
The currency crises of the 1990s underscored the need to avoid overval-
ued real exchange rates—that is, real exchange rates that are incompatible
with maintaining sustainable external accounts. In the spring 1994 meetings
of the Brookings Institution Economics Panel, Rudi Dornbusch argued
that the Mexican peso was overvalued by at least 30 percent and that the au-
thorities should rapidly find a way to solve the problem. In that same meet-
ing, Stanley Fischer, soon to become the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF’s) first deputy managing director, expressed his concerns regarding
the external sustainability of the Mexican experiment. Internal U.S. gov-
ernment communications released to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee
during 1995 also reflect a mounting concern among some U.S. oﬃcials. Sev-
eral staﬀ members of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for example,
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argued that a devaluation of the peso could not be ruled out. For example,
according to documents released by the U.S. Senate, on 27 October 1994 an
unidentified Treasury staﬀ member commented to Secretary Lloyd Bensten
that “[rigid] exchange rate policy under the new Pacto [the tripartite in-
comes policy agreement between government, unions, and the private sec-
tor] could inhibit a sustainable external position” (D’Amato 1995, 308).
The overvaluation of the Mexican peso in the process leading to the 1994
currency crisis has been documented by a number of postcrisis studies. Ac-
cording to Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), for example, during the
1990–94 period the Mexican peso was overvalued, on average, by almost 29
percent (see their table 9). An ex post analysis by Ades and Kaune (1997),
using a detailed empirical model that decomposed fundamentals’ changes
in permanent and temporary changes, indicates that by the fourth quarter
of 1994 the Mexican peso was overvalued by 16 percent. According to
Goldman Sachs, in late 1998 the Brazilian real was overvalued by approxi-
mately 14 percent. Moreover, although the investment houses did not ven-
ture to estimate the degree of misalignment of the Russian ruble, during the
first half of 1997 there was generalized agreement that it had become se-
verely overvalued.
The East Asian nations did not escape the real exchange rate overvalua-
tion syndrome. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), for instance, have ar-
gued that by late 1994 the real exchange rate picture in the East Asian coun-
tries was mixed and looked as follows: While the Philippines and Korea
were experiencing overvaluation, Malaysia and Indonesia had undervalued
real exchange rates, and the Thai baht appeared to be in equilibrium. Chinn
(1998) used a standard monetary model to estimate the appropriateness of
nominal exchange rates in East Asia before the crisis. According to his re-
sults, in the first quarter of 1997 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand had
overvalued exchange rates, whereas Korea and the Philippines were facing
undervaluation.
After the Mexican and East Asian crises, analysts in academia, the mul-
tilaterals, and the private sector have redoubled their eﬀorts to understand
real exchange rate (RER) behavior in emerging economies. Generally
speaking, the RER is said to be “misaligned” if its actual value exhibits a
(sustained) departure from its long-run equilibrium. The latter, in turn, is
defined as the RER that, for given values of “fundamentals,” is compatible
with the simultaneous achievement of internal and external equilibrium.2
Most recent eﬀorts to assess misalignment have tried to go beyond simple
versions of purchasing power parity (PPP) and to incorporate explicitly the
behavior of variables such as terms of trade, real interest rates, and pro-
ductivity growth. Accordingly to a recently published World Bank book
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2. For theoretical discussions on real exchange rates, see Frenkel and Razin (1987) and Ed-
wards (1989).
(Hinkle and Montiel 1999), one of the most common methods for assessing
real exchange rates is based on single-equation, time series econometric es-
timates. The empirical implementation of this approach is based on the fol-
lowing steps:
1. A group of variables that, according to theory, aﬀect the RER is iden-
tified. These variables are called the RER fundamentals and usually include
the country’s terms of trade, its degree of openness, productivity diﬀeren-
tials, government expenditure, foreign direct investment, and international
interest rates.
2. Time series techniques are used to estimate an RER equation. The re-
gressors are the fundamentals listed above. In most cases, an error correc-
tion model is used to estimate this equation.
3. The fundamentals are decomposed into a “permanent” and a “tem-
porary” component. This is usually done by using a well-accepted statisti-
cal technique, such as the Hodrick-Prescott decomposition.
4. The permanent components of the fundamentals are inserted into the
estimated RER equation. The resulting “fitted” time series is interpreted as
the path through time of the estimated equilibrium RER.
5. Finally, the estimated equilibrium RER is compared to the actual
RER. Deviations between these two rates are interpreted as misalignment.
If the actual RER is stronger than the estimated equilibrium, the country in
question is considered to face an RER overvaluation.
In the late 1990s Goldman Sachs (1997) implemented an RER model
(largely) based on this methodology. The first version of this model, re-
leased in October of 1996—almost eight months before the eruption of the
East Asian crisis—indicated that the RER was overvalued in Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. Subsequent releases of the model incorpo-
rated additional countries and suggested that the Korean won and the
Malaysian ringgit were also (slightly) overvalued. In mid-1997, Goldman
Sachs introduced a new refined version of its model; according to these new
estimates, in June of 1997 the currencies of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand were overvalued, as were the currencies of Hong
Kong and Singapore. In contrast, these calculations suggested that the Tai-
wanese dollar was undervalued by approximately 7 percent. Although, ac-
cording to Goldman Sachs, in June 1997 the degree of overvaluation was
rather modest in all five East Asian crisis countries, its estimates suggested
that overvaluation had been persistent for a number of years: in Indonesia
the RER had been overvalued since 1993, in Korea in 1988, in Malaysia in
1993, in the Philippines in 1992, and in Thailand since 1990 (see Edwards
and Savastano 1999 for a review of other applications of this model for as-
sessing RER overvaluation).
More recently, JPMorgan (2000) unveiled its own RER model. In an
eﬀort to better capture the dynamic behavior of RERs, this model went be-
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yond the “fundamentals” and explicitly incorporated the role of monetary
variables in the short run. In spite of this improvement, this model retained
many of the features of the single-equation RER models summarized above
and analyzed in greater detail in Edwards and Savastano (1999).
Although the methodology described above—and increasingly used by
the multilateral institutions and investment banks—represents a major im-
provement over simple PPP-based calculations, it is still subject to some lim-
itations. The most important one is that, as is the case in all residuals-based
models, it assumes that the RER is, on average, in equilibrium during the pe-
riod under study. This, of course, need not be the case. Second, this approach
ignores the roles of debt accumulation and of current account dynamics.
Third, the simpler applications of this model ignore the major jumps in the
RER following a nominal devaluation. This, in turn, will tend to badly bias
the results and to generate misleading predictions. A fourth shortcoming of
these models is that they do not specify a direct relationship between the es-
timated equilibrium RER and measures of internal equilibrium, including
the level of unemployment, or the relation between actual and potential
growth. Fifth, many times this type of econometric-based analysis generates
results that are counterintuitive and, more seriously perhaps, tend to con-
tradict the conclusions obtained from more detailed country-specific stud-
ies (see Edwards and Savastano 1999 for a detailed discussion).
An alternative approach to evaluate the appropriateness of the RER at a
particular moment in time consists of calculating the “sustainable” current
account deficit, as a prior step to calculating the equilibrium RER. The
simplest versions of this model—sometimes associated with the IMF—
rely on (rather basic) general equilibrium simulations and usually do not
use econometric estimates of an RER equation. Recently, Deutsche Bank
(2000) used a model along these lines to assess RER developments in Latin
America. According to this model, the sustainable level of the current ac-
count is determined, in the steady state, by the country’s rate of (potential)
GDP growth, world inflation, and the international (net) demand for the
country’s liabilities. If a country’s actual current account deficit exceeds
its sustainable level, the RER will have to depreciate in order to help re-
store long-run sustainable equilibrium. Using specific parameter values,
Deutsche Bank (2000) computed both the sustainable level of the current
account and the degree of RER overvaluation for a group of Latin Ameri-
can countries during early 2000. It is illustrative to compare the estimated
degree of RER overvaluation according to the Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan,
and Deutsche Bank models for a selected group of Latin American nations.
This is done in table 1.1, where a positive (negative) number denotes over-
valuation (undervaluation). These figures refer to the situation in March-
April 2000. As may be seen, for some of the countries—Brazil being the pre-
mier example—the calculated extent of overvaluation varies significantly
across models. The above discussion, including the results in table 1.1, re-
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flects quite vividly the eminent diﬃculties in assessing whether a country’s
currency is indeed out of line with its long-term equilibrium. These diﬃcul-
ties are more pronounced under pegged or fixed exchange rate regimes than
under floating exchange rate regimes.
On Optimal Exit Strategies
In the aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis, the notion that (most) ex-
change rate anchors eventually result in acute overvaluation prompted many
analysts to revise their views on exchange rate policies. A large number of au-
thors argued that in countries with an inflationary problem, after a short ini-
tial period with a pegged exchange rate, a more flexible regime should be
adopted. This position was taken, for example, by Dornbusch (1997, 137),
who, referring to lessons from Mexico, said, “crawl now, or crash later.” The
late Michael Bruno (1995, 282), then the influential chief economist at the
World Bank, said that “[t]he choice of the exchange rate as the nominal an-
chor only relates to the initial phase of stabilization.” Bruno’s position was
greatly influenced by his own experience as a policymaker in Israel, where,
in order to avoid the overvaluation syndrome, a pegged exchange rate had
been replaced by a sliding, forward-looking crawling band in 1989.
The view that a pegged exchange rate should only be maintained for a short
period of time, while expectations are readjusted, has also been taken by
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1995), who argued that “[t]he eﬀectiveness of ex-
change rate pegging is probably higher in the early stages of an anti-inflation
program.” Goldstein (1998, 51), maintained that “all things considered, mov-
ing toward greater flexibility of exchange rate at an early stage (before the
overvaluation becomes too large) will be the preferred course of action.”
In 1998 the IMF published a long study on “exit strategies,” in which it set
forward the conditions required for successfully abandoning a pegged ex-
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Table 1.1 Alternative Estimates of Degree of Overvaluation in Selected Latin
American Countries, March–April 2000 (%)
Country Goldman Sachs JPMorgan Deutsche Bank
Argentina 7 13 17
Brazil –11 1 5
Chile 5 –8 0
Colombia –4 0 10
Mexico 22 3 –2
Peru –2 –5 5
Venezuela 44 9 n.a.
Sources: Goldman Sachs, “Latin America Economic Analyst” (March 2000). JPMorgan,
“Introducing JPMorgan’s Emerging Markets Real Exchange Rate Model” (3 April 2000).
Deutsche Bank, “Latin America Current Accounts: Can They Achieve Sustainability?” (22
March 2000).
Note: n.a. = not available.
change rate system (Eichengreen et al. 1998). This important document
reached three main conclusions: (a) most emerging countries would benefit
from greater exchange rate flexibility; (b) the probability of a successful exit
strategy is higher if the pegged rate is abandoned at a time of abundant cap-
ital inflows; and (c) countries should strengthened their fiscal and monetary
policies before exiting the pegged exchange rate. This document also pointed
out that because most exits happened during a crisis, the authorities should
devise policies to avoid “overdepreciation.” An important implication of this
document is that it is easier for countries to exit an exchange rate nominal
anchor from a situation of strength and credibility than from one of weak-
ness and low credibility. That is, the probability of a successful exit will be
higher if after the exit, and under the newly floating exchange rate regime, the
currency strengthens. In this case the authorities’ degree of credibility will
not be battered, as the exit will not be associated with a major devaluation
and crisis, as has often been the case in the past. Chile and Poland provide
two cases of successful exits into a flexible exchange rates in the late 1990s.
The most diﬃcult aspect of orderly exits—and one that is not discussed
in detail in the 1998 IMF document—is related to the political economy of
exchange rates and macroeconomic adjustment. At the core of this problem
is the fact that the political authorities tend to focus on short-term horizons
and usually discount the future very heavily. This situation is particularly
acute in the emerging economies, where there are no politically indepen-
dent institutions with a longer time horizon. In many (but not all) industrial
countries, independent central banks have tended to take the role of the
longer perspective.3
Defining an appropriate exit strategy from a fixed exchange rate amounts,
in very simple terms, to estimating the time when the marginal benefit of
maintaining a pegged rate becomes equal to the marginal cost of that pol-
icy. As was pointed out above, the greatest benefit of a nominal exchange
rate anchor is that it guides inflationary expectations down at the same time
that it imposes a ceiling on tradable goods’ prices. There is ample empirical
evidence suggesting that these positive eﬀects of a nominal anchor are par-
ticularly high during the early stages of a disinflation program (Kiguel and
Liviatan 1995). As times goes by, however, and as inflation declines, these
benefits will also decline. On the other hand, the more important cost of re-
lying on an exchange rate nominal anchor is given by the fact that, in the
presence of (even partial) inflationary inertia, the RER will become appre-
ciated, reducing the country’s degree of competitiveness. To the extent that
the real appreciation is not oﬀset by changes in fundamentals, such as
higher productivity gains, the cost of the exchange rate anchor will tend to
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3. Interestingly enough, in the few emerging countries with an independent central bank, ex-
change rate policy tends to be in the hands of the ministry of finance. This was, for instance,
the case of Mexico in 1994.
increase through time. Figure 1.1 provides a simple representation of this
situation of declining benefits and increasing time-dependent costs of an
exchange rate anchor (C denotes costs and B refers to benefits). The actual
slopes of these curves will depend on structural parameters and on other
policies pursued by the country. These include the country’s degree of open-
ness, expectations, the fiscal stance, and the degree of formal and informal
indexation. In figure 1.1, the two schedules cross at time , which becomes
the optimal exit time. Three important points should be noted. First,
changes in the conditions faced by the country in question could indeed
shift these schedules, altering the optimal exit time. Second, it is possible
that, for a particular constellation of parameters, the two schedules do not
intersect. Naturally, this would be the case where the optimal steady-state
regime is a pegged exchange rate. Third, “private” cost and benefits will
usually be diﬀerent from “social” costs and benefits. That would be the case
when, due to political considerations, the authorities are subject to “short-
termism.” In this case, benefits will tend to be overestimated and costs un-
derestimated, resulting in a postponement of the optimal exit. Postponing
the exit could—and usually does—result in serious costs, in the form of
bankruptcies, major disruptions in economic activity, and, in some cases,
the collapse of the banking system (Edwards and Montiel 1989).
The Death of Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes 
and the “Two-Corner” Approach
After the East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises, economists’ views on
nominal exchange rate regimes continued to evolve. Fixed-but-adjustable
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Fig. 1.1 Optimal exit: Private and social optimal timing
regimes rapidly lost adepts, while the two extreme positions—super-fixed
(through a currency board or dollarization), and freely floating rates—
gained in popularity. This view is clearly captured by the following quota-
tion from U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers (2000, 8):
[F]or economies with access to international capital markets, [the choice
of the appropriate exchange rate regime] increasingly means a move away
from the middle ground of pegged but adjustable fixed exchange rates to-
ward the two corner regimes of either flexible exchange rates, or a fixed
exchange rate supported, if necessary, by a commitment to give up alto-
gether an independent monetary policy.
Summers goes on to argue, as do most supporters of the “two-corner”
approach to exchange rate regimes, that this policy prescription “probably
has less to do with Robert Mundell’s traditional optimal currency areas
considerations than with a country’s capacity to operate a discretionary
monetary policy in a way that will reduce rather than increase the variance
in economic output” (9).
From a historical perspective the current support for the two-corner ap-
proach, is largely based on the shortcomings of the intermediate systems—
pegged-but-adjustable, managed float, and (narrow) bands—and not on
the historical merits of either of the two-corner systems. The reason for this
is that in emerging markets there have been very few historical experiences
with either super-fixity or with floating. Among the super-fixers, Argentina,
Hong Kong, and Estonia have had currency boards and Panama has been
dollarized.4 This is not a large sample. Among floaters, the situation is not
better. Mexico is one of the few countries with a somewhat long experience
with a flexible rate (1995 to date), and most of it has taken place during pe-
riods of high international turmoil (see, however, the discussion in section
1.1.4 of this paper).
The IMF entered this debate in a rather guarded way. Eichengreen, Mas-
son, Savastano, and Sharma (1999, 6) capture the Fund’s view regarding
exchange rate regimes quite vividly:
Experience has shown that an adjustable peg or a tightly managed float
with occasional large adjustments is a diﬃcult situation to sustain under
high capital mobility. . . . In an environment of high capital mobility,
therefore, the exchange regime needs to be either a peg that is defended
with great determination . . . or it needs to be a managed float where the
exchange rate moves regularly in response to market forces.
Notice that, although these authors reject intermediate regimes, they fall
considerably short of endorsing a free float. Indeed, in discussing the most
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4. Recently Ecuador has gone through a dollarization process, but it is too early to analyze
the results of that reform. A number of smaller nations, however, have historically had cur-
rency boards. See the discussion in Hanke and Schuler (1994).
appropriate policy action in emerging economies, they argue that market
forces should be supplemented with “some resistance from intervention
and other policy adjustments” (6).
Current skepticism regarding pegged-but-adjustable regimes is partially
based on the eﬀect that large devaluations tend to have on firms’ balance
sheets and, thus, on the banking sector. As the experience of Indonesia dra-
matically showed, this eﬀect is particularly severe in countries where the
corporate sector has a large debt denominated in foreign currency.5 Calvo
(2001) has oﬀered one of the very few theoretical justifications for ruling out
middle-of-the road exchange rate regimes. He has argued that in a world
with capital mobility and poorly informed market participants, emerging
countries are subject to rumors, runs, and (unjustified) panics. This is be-
cause these uninformed participants may—and usually will—misinterpret
events in the global market. This situation may be remedied, or at least min-
imized, by the adoption of a very transparent and credible policy stance.
According to Calvo, only two types of regimes satisfy this requirement: su-
per-fixes, and in particular dollarization, and a (very) clean float. In section
1.1.4 of this paper I discuss in great detail the most important issues related
to this view.
It is important to note that although the two-corner solution has become
increasingly popular in academic policy circles in the United States and Eu-
rope, it is beginning to be resisted in other parts of the world, and in partic-
ular in Asia. In the recently released report on crisis prevention, the Asian
Policy Forum (2000, 4) has argued: “[T]he two extreme exchange rate
regimes . . . are not appropriate for Asian economies. Instead, an interme-
diate exchange rate system that could mitigate the negative eﬀects of the two
extreme regimes would be more appropriate for most Asian economies.”
1.1.3 Capital Flow Reversals, Capital Controls, 
and Exchange Rate Regimes
One of the fundamental propositions in recent debates on exchange rate
regimes is that under free capital mobility, the exchange rate regime deter-
mines the ability to undertake independent monetary policy.6 A (super)
fixed regime implies giving up monetary independence, whereas a freely
floating regime allows for a national monetary policy (Summers 2000). This
idea has been associated with the so-called “impossibility of the Holy Trin-
ity”: it is not possible to simultaneously have free capital mobility, a pegged
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5. In 1982 Chile experienced the eﬀects of a major devaluation on a corporate sector that
was highly leveraged in foreign currency. For a thorough discussion of the case, see Edwards
and Edwards (1991).
6. This, of course, is an old proposition dating back, at least, to the writings of Bob Mundell
in the early 1960s. Recently, however, and as a result of the exchange rate policy debates, it has
acquired renewed force.
exchange rate, and an independent monetary policy. Some authors have ar-
gued, however, that this is a false policy dilemma, since there is no reason
that emerging economies have to allow free capital mobility. Indeed, the
fact that currency crises are almost invariably the result of capital flow re-
versals has led some authors to argue that capital controls—and in partic-
ular controls on capital inflows—can reduce the risk of a currency crisis.
Most supporters of this view have based their recommendation on Chile’s
experience with capital controls during the 1990s. Joe Stiglitz, the former
World Bank chief economist, has been quoted by the New York Times (1
February 1998) as saying: “You want to look for policies that discourage
hot money but facilitate the flow of long-term loans, and there is evidence
that the Chilean approach or some version of it, does this.” More recently,
the Asian Policy Forum has explicitly recommended the control of capital
inflows as a way of preventing future crises in the region. The Forum’s pol-
icy recommendation number two reads as follows: “If an Asian economy
experiences continued massive capital inflows that threaten eﬀective do-
mestic monetary management, it may install the capability to implement
unremunerated reserve requirements (URR) and a minimum holding pe-
riod on capital inflows” (page 5).
In this section I discuss in detail the most important aspect of the con-
trols on capital inflows, and I evaluate Chile’s experience with these poli-
cies.7 More specifically, I focus on three issues: First, is there evidence that
Chile’s capital controls aﬀected the composition of capital flows? Second, is
there evidence that the imposition of these restrictions increased Chile’s
ability to undertake independent monetary policy? Third, did these con-
trols help Chile reduce the degree of macroeconomic instability and vulner-
ability to externally originated shocks?8
Background
Chile introduced restrictions on capital inflows in June 1991.9 Initially, all
portfolio inflows were subject to a 20 percent reserve deposit that earned no
interest. For maturities of less than a year, the deposit applied for the dura-
tion of the inflow, whereas for longer maturities, the reserve requirement
was for one year. In July 1992 the rate of the reserve requirement was raised
to 30 percent, and its holding period was set at one year, independently of
the length of stay of the flow. Also, at that time its coverage was extended to
trade credit and to loans related to foreign direct investment. New changes
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7. By now there are numerous pieces dealing with these issues. See, for example, Edwards
(1999a,b), De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000), and the literature cited therein.
8. Most analyses of the Chilean experience with controls on inflows also analyze their im-
pact on real exchange rate dynamics. Due to space consideration, and because it is only a tan-
gentially relevant issue, I do not deal with it in this paper. See, however, my discussion in Ed-
wards (1998a).
9. Chile had had a similar system during the 1970s. See Edwards and Edwards (1991).
were introduced in 1995, when the reserve requirement coverage was ex-
tended to Chilean stocks traded in the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs),
to financial foreign direct investment (FDI), and bond issues. In June of
1998, and as a way of fighting oﬀ contagion coming from the East Asian cri-
sis, the rate of the reserve requirement was lowered to 10 percent, and in
September of that year the deposit rate was reduced to zero. Throughout
this period Chile also regulated FDI: until 1992, FDI was subject to a three-
year minimum stay in the country; at that time the minimum stay was re-
duced to one year, and in early 2000 it was eliminated. There are no restric-
tions on the repatriation of profits from FDI.10
In 1991, when the capital controls policy was introduced, the authorities
had three goals in mind: First, to slow down the volume of capital flowing
into the country, and to tilt its composition toward longer maturities. Sec-
ond, to reduce (or at least delay) the RER appreciation that stemmed from
these inflows. Third, to allow the Central Bank to maintain a high diﬀeren-
tial between domestic and international interest rates. This, in turn, was ex-
pected to help the government’s eﬀort to reduce inflation to the lower
single-digit level. It was further expected that the controls would reduce the
country’s vulnerability to international financial instability (Cowan and de
Gregorio 1998; Massad 1998a; Valdés-Prieto and Soto 1998).
Chile’s system of unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs) is equiv-
alent to a tax on capital inflows. The rate of the tax depends on both the pe-
riod of time during which the funds stay in the country and the opportunity
cost of these funds. As shown by Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) and De Gre-
gorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000), the tax equivalent for funds that stay in
Chile for k months is given by the following expression:
(1) (k)  (1r∗ ) k,
where r∗ is an international interest rate that captures the opportunity cost
of the reserve requirement,  is the proportion of the funds that has to be
deposited at the Central Bank, and  is the period of time (measured in
months) that the deposit has to be kept in the Central Bank.
Figure 1.2 contains estimates of this tax equivalent for three values of k:
six months, one year, and three years. Three aspects of this figure are par-
ticularly interesting: First, the rate of the tax is inversely related to the length
of stay of the funds in the country. This, of course, was exactly the intent of
the policy, because the authorities wanted to discourage short-term inflows.
Second, the rate of the tax is quite high even for a three-year period. Dur-
ing 1997, for example, the average tax for three-year funds was 80 basis
points. Third, the tax equivalent has varied through time, both because the
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10. Parts of this section rely on my previous work on the subject. See also the discussion by
Massad (1998a).
rate of the required deposit was altered and because the opportunity cost
has changed.
Capital Controls and the Composition of Capital Inflows in Chile
In table 1.2 I present data, from the Central Bank of Chile, on the com-
position of capital inflows into Chile between 1988 and 1998. As may be
seen, during this period shorter-term flows—that is, flows with less than
one-year maturity—declined steeply relative to longer-term capital. The
fact that this change in composition happened immediately after the imple-
mentation of the policy provides some support for the view that by restrict-
ing capital mobility, the authorities indeed aﬀected their composition.
These data also show that, with the exception of a brief decline in 1993, the
total volume of capital inflows into the country continued to increase until
1998. In constructing the figures in table 1.2, the Central Bank of Chile clas-
sified inflows as short term or long term on the basis of contracted maturity.
It is possible to argue, however, that when measuring a country’s degree of
vulnerability to financial turmoil what really matters is residual maturity,
measured by the value of the country’s liabilities in the hands of foreigners
that mature within a year. Table 1.3 presents data, from the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements, on residual maturity for loans extended by Group of
Ten (G10) banks to Chile and a group of selected of Latin American and
East Asian countries. The results are quite revealing. First, once residual
maturity is used, the percentage of short-term debt does not look as low as
when contracting maturities are considered. Second, the figures in table 1.3
indicate that in late 1996 Chile had a lower percentage of short-term debt to
G10 banks than any of the East Asian countries, with the exception of
Malaysia. Third, although by end 1996 Chile had a relatively low percent-
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Fig. 1.2 Tax equivalent of capital controls: Stay of 180 days, 1 year, 3 years
age of short-term residual debt, it was not significantly lower than that of
Argentina, a country with no capital restrictions, and it was higher than
that of Mexico, another Latin American country without controls. Fourth,
Chile experienced a significant reduction in its residual short-term debt be-
tween 1996 and 1998.
A number of authors have used regression analysis to investigate the de-
terminants of capital flows in Chile and to determine whether the controls
on inflows have indeed aﬀected the composition of these flows. Soto (1997)
and De Gregorio, Borenzstein, and Lee (1998), for example, have used vec-
tor autoregression analysis on monthly data to analyze the way in which
capital controls have aﬀected the composition of capital inflows. Their re-
sults confirm the picture presented in tables 1.2 and 1.3 and suggest that the
tax on capital movements discouraged short-term inflows. These early stud-
ies suggest, however, that the reduction in shorter-term flows was fully com-
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Table 1.2 Capital Inflows (Gross) to Chile (US$ millions)
Year Short-Term Flows % of Total Long-Term Flows % of Total Total Deposits
1988 916,564 96.3 34,838 3.7 951,402 n.a.
1989 1,452,595 95.0 77,122 5.0 1,529,717 n.a.
1990 1,683,149 90.3 181,419 9.7 1,864,568 n.a.
1991 521,198 72.7 196,115 27.3 717,313 587
1992 225,197 28.9 554,072 71.1 779,269 11,424
1993 159,462 23.6 515,147 76.4 674,609 41,280
1994 161,575 16.5 819,699 83.5 981,274 87,039
1995 69,675 6.2 1,051,829 93.8 1,121,504 38,752
1996 67,254 3.2 2,042,456 96.8 2,109,710 172,320
1997 81,131 2.8 2,805,882 97.2 2,887,013 331,572
Notes: Deposits in the Central Bank of Chile are due to reserve requirements. n.a. = not applicable.
Table 1.3 Ratio of Short-Term Bank Loans to Total Bank Loans (%)
Mid-1996 End 1996 Mid-1997 End 1997 Mid-1998
Argentina 53.4 56.3 54.2 57.7 57.4
Brazil 57.7 63.0 62.6 64.3 62.6
Chile 57.7 51.2 43.3 50.4 45.9
Colombia 45.9 39.3 39.4 40.0 39.6
Mexico 47.8 44.7 45.5 43.7 44.9
Peru 78.3 79.2 67.0 69.3 75.7
Indonesia 60.0 61.7 59.0 60.6 55.0
Korea 70.8 67.5 68.0 62.8 45.8
Malaysia 49.7 50.3 56.4 52.7 48.6
Taiwan 86.4 84.4 87.3 81.6 80.1
Thailand 68.9 65.2 65.7 65.8 59.3
Source: The Bank for International Settlements.
pensated by increases in longer-term capital inflows and that, consequently,
aggregate capital moving into Chile was not altered by this policy. More-
over, Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1996) have argued that the controls only be-
came eﬀective in discouraging short-term flows after 1995, when the tax-
equivalent rate of the deposits had increased significantly.
In a recent study, De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000) use a new
data set to evaluate the eﬀects of the URR on the volume and composition
of capital inflows into Chile. Using semistructural vector autoregressions
(VARs), the authors conclude that this policy aﬀected negatively, and quite
strongly, short-term flows. More specifically, they estimated that the pres-
ence of the URR implied that, on average, quarterly short-term flows were
between 0.5 and 1.0 percentage points of GDP below what they would have
been otherwise. Their results for total flows, however, show that the capital
controls policy had not had a significant eﬀect on this aggregate variable.
A traditional shortcoming of capital controls (either on outflows or in-
flows) is that it is relatively easy for investors to avoid them. Valdés-Prieto
and Soto (1998), for example, have argued that in spite of the authorities’
eﬀorts to close loopholes, Chile’s controls have been subject to considerable
evasion. Cowan and De Gregario (1997) acknowledged this fact and con-
structed a subjective index of the “power” of the controls. This index takes
a value of 1 if there is no (or very little) evasion and takes a value of zero if
there is complete evasion. According to these authors, this index reached its
lowest value during the second quarter of 1995; by late 1997 and early 1998
this index had reached a value of 0.8.
Capital Controls and Monetary Policy in Chile
One of the alleged virtues of Chile-style capital controls is that, in the pre-
sence of pegged exchange rates, they allow the country in question greater
control over its monetary policy. That is, in the presence of controls, the lo-
cal monetary authorities will have the ability to aﬀect domestic (short-) term
interest rates. In fact, this greater control over monetary policy has been
one of the reasons given in support of the imposition of this type of con-
trols in the Asian nations (Asian Policy Forum 2000).
A small number of studies has used Chilean data to look empirically at
this issue. Using a VAR analysis, De Gregorio, Borenzstein, and Lee (1998)
and Soto (1997) found that an innovation to the tax had a positive and very
small short-term eﬀect on indexed interest rates. In Edwards (1998b), I used
monthly data to analyze whether, after the imposition of the controls (and
after controlling for other variables), there was an increase in the diﬀeren-
tial between dollar- and peso-denominated interest rates (properly adjusted
by expected devaluation). I tested this proposition by using rolling regres-
sions to estimate the parameters of an AR(1) process for the interest rate
diﬀerential. I found out that, although the steady-state interest rate diﬀer-
ential had actually declined after the imposition of the controls in 1991, it
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had become more sluggish.11 That is, after the imposition of the controls—
and in particular after their tightening in 1993—it took a longer period of
time for interest rate diﬀerentials to decline until they reached their steady-
state equilibrium. I interpreted this evidence as suggesting that the controls
had indeed increased Chile’s control over short-run monetary policy. These
results largely confirmed those obtained by Laurens and Cardoso (1998).
De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000) have recently used monthly
data to estimate a series of semistructural VARs. Their main interest was to
analyze the way in which a shock to the URR tax equivalent aﬀects a num-
ber of macroeconomic variables. In addition to the tax equivalent of the
controls, their analysis included the following endogenous variables: do-
mestic (indexed) interest rates;12 a proxy for the expected rate of deprecia-
tion; short- and long-term capital flows; and RER-eﬀective depreciation. In
addition, they introduced the six-month Libor interest rate and the JP-
Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index. The results obtained from this
analysis suggest that in response to a 1–standard deviation shock to the tax
equivalent of the capital controls aﬀected domestic interest rates positively.
The eﬀect, however, is quantitatively small—between 10 and 25 basis
points—and peaked after six months. This means that the capital controls
policy did help Chile’s monetary authorities’ eﬀorts to target short-term do-
mestic interest rates without unleashing a vicious circle of higher rates fol-
lowed by higher capital inflows, monetary sterilization, and even higher
domestic interest rates.
Controls on Capital Inflows, External Vulnerability, and Contagion
From a crisis prevention perspective, a particularly important question is
whether Chile-style controls on inflows reduce financial vulnerability and,
thus, lower the probability of a country’s being subject to contagion. At a
more specific historical level, the question is whether Chile was spared from
financial contagion during the period when the controls on capital inflows
were in eﬀect (1991–98). In particular, did these controls isolate Chile’s key
macroeconomics variables—and especially domestic interest rates—from
externally generated financial turmoil? In panel A of figure 1.3 I present
weekly data on the evolution of Chile’s ninety-day deposit interest rates for
1996–99.13 This figure provides a very interesting (preliminary) picture of
the way in which Chile’s domestic financial market reacted to externally
generated disturbances. The most salient aspects of this figure are
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11. The decline in the steady-state interest rate diﬀerential was attributed to the reduction of
Chile’s country risk premium.
12. For more than thirty years Chile’s financial sector has operated on the bases of inflation-
adjusted, or indexed, interest rates. The vast majority of financial transactions of maturities in
excess of thirty days are documented in Chile’s unit of account, the Unidad de Fomento (UF).
13. Although the data for thirty-day rates refer to nominal rates, those for ninety-day de-
posits are in Chile’s “real” (inflation-corrected) unit of account.
• Chile’s domestic interest rates reacted very mildly to the Mexican crisis
of December 1994. In fact, as may be seen from the figure, there was a
very short-lived spike in January of 1995. During the rest of that year—
and at a time when most of Latin America was suﬀering from the so-
called Tequila eﬀect—Chile’s interest rates remained low and stable.
The tranquility in Chile’s financial markets at the time is captured
clearly in panel B of figure 1.3, where interest rates in Chile and Argen-
tina are depicted (notice Argentina did not have any form of capital
controls during this period).
• Until late 1997—that is, even after the Asian crisis erupted—Chile’s in-
terest rates continued to be low and relatively stable. Indeed, this great
stability in domestic interest rates between 1994 and the first ten
months of 1997 contributed greatly to the notion that Chile’s controls




Fig. 1.3 A, Chile nominal interest rates; B, Comparative rates with Argentina
B
• Throughout the October 1997–September 1998 period, and in spite of
the presence of the controls, Chile’s domestic interest rates were subject
to massive increases. These jumps were largely in response to increased
financial turmoil in Asia and to the Russian default of August 1998 and
took place in spite of the fact that during this time the controls were
tightened.
• Paradoxically, perhaps, financial stability in Chile returned in the last
quarter of 1999, after the controls had been reduced to zero.
Figure 1.3, on Chile’s domestic interest rates behavior, suggests that dur-
ing the second half of the 1990s there was structural change in the process
generating this interest rates. More specifically, it appears that around
1997–98 there was a break in the relationship between Chile’s interest rates
and emerging countries’ risk premia. Although during the early years
Chile’s domestic financial market was not subject to contagion, the situa-
tion appears to have changed quite drastically in 1997–98. What makes this
particularly interesting is that this apparent structural break that increased
Chile’s vulnerability to external disturbances took place at a time when the
authorities were expanding the coverage of the controls on inflows (see De
Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes 2000 for details).
In order to investigate this issue formally, I analyzed the way in which
Chile’s interest rates responded to shocks to the emerging markets’ “re-
gional” risk premium, as measured by the cyclical component of JPMor-
gan’s EMBI index for non–Latin American countries. I estimated a series of
VAR systems using weekly data for a number of subperiods spanning 1994–
99.14 The following endogenous variables were included in the estimation:
1. The cyclical component of the non–Latin American emerging mar-
kets’ JPMorgan EMBI index.15 An increase in this index reflects a higher
market price of (non–Latin American) emerging markets’ securities and,
thus, a reduction in the perceived riskiness of these countries. Given the
composition of the EMBI index, this indicator mostly captures the evolu-
tion of the market perception of “country risk” in Asia and Eastern Eu-
rope.16
2. The cyclical component of the Latin American emerging markets’ JP-
Morgan EMBI index.
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14. The use of weekly data permits us to interpret the interest rates’ impulse response func-
tion to a “regional risk” shock in a structural way. This interpretation requires that changes in
domestic interest rates not be reflected in changes in the non–Latin American EMBI index
during the same week. In the case of Chile, this is a particularly reasonable assumption, be-
cause during most of the period under consideration Chilean securities were not included in
any of the emerging market EMBI indexes. The period was chosen in order to exclude the tur-
moil generated two major crises. For comparative purposes I estimated similar VARs for Ar-
gentina and Mexico.
15. The cyclical component was calculated by subtracting the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the
index itself.
16. Details on the index can be found in JPMorgan’s website.
3. The weekly rate of change in the Mexican peso-U.S. dollar exchange
rate.
4. The weekly rate of change in the Chilean peso-U.S. dollar exchange
rate.
5. The spread between ninety-day peso and U.S. dollar–denominated
deposits in Argentina. This spread is considered as a measure of the expec-
tations of devaluation in Argentina.
6. Argentine ninety-day, peso-denominated deposit rates.
7. Mexican ninety-day, certificate of deposit nominal rates expressed in
pesos.
8. Chilean ninety-day deposit rates in domestic currency.17
In addition, interest rates on U.S. thirty-year bonds were included as an ex-
ogenous variable. All the data were obtained from the Datastream data set.
In the estimation a two-lag structure, which is suggested by the Schwarz cri-
teria, was used. In determining the ordering of the variables for the VAR es-
timation, I considered the (cyclical component of the) EMBI index for non–
Latin American emerging markets, and the EMBI for Latin American
countries to be, in that order, the two most exogenous variables. The results
obtained indicate that Chile’s domestic interest rates were aﬀected signifi-
cantly by financial shocks from abroad. One–standard deviation positive
(negative) shock to the non–Latin American EMBI index generates a sta-
tistically significant decline (increase) in Chile’s domestic interest rates. This
eﬀect peaks at 30 basis points after three weeks and dies oﬀ after seven
weeks.
This exercise also suggests that domestic interest rates in Argentina and
Mexico were significantly aﬀected by shocks to the non–Latin American
EMBI index. Generally speaking, then, this analysis provides some prelim-
inary evidence suggesting that shocks emanating from other emerging re-
gions were transmitted to the Latin nations in a way that is independent of
the existence of controls on capital inflows.
In order to analyze whether the relationship determining Chile’s domes-
tic interest rates experienced a break point in the second half of the 1990s,
I compared the error variance decomposition for Chile’s interest rates for
two subperiods. The first subperiod extends from the first week of 1994
through the last week of 1996, whereas the second subperiod covers the first
week of 1997 through the last week of October 1999. That is, the first sub-
period includes only the Mexican crisis, whereas the second subperiod cov-
ers the East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises. The results obtained in-
deed suggest the existence of an important structural break: during the first
subperiod the EMBI indexes explained less than 1 percent of the variance
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17. As pointed out above, these deposit rates are expressed in “real” pesos. That is, they are
in terms of Chile’s inflation-adjusted unit of account, the so-called UF. During the period un-
der study, Chile did not have a deep market for nominal ninety-day deposits.
of Chile’s interest rates; during the second subperiod, however, these two
indexes explained almost 25 percent of this variance. These results, then, in-
dicate that toward late 1997 the eﬀectiveness of capital controls in shielding
Chile from external disturbances had diminished significantly.
Overall, my reading of Chile’s experience with controls on inflows is that
they were successful in changing the maturity profile of capital inflows and
of the country’s foreign debt. Also, the controls allowed the monetary au-
thority to have greater control over monetary policy. This eﬀect, however,
appears to have been confined to the short run and was not very important
quantitatively. The evidence—and, in particular, the new results reported
above—suggests that Chile was vulnerable to the propagation of shocks
coming from other emerging markets. Moreover, these results indicate that
in late 1997, six years after having controls on capital inflows put in place,
the relationship between domestic interest rates and emerging markets’
risk experienced a significant structural break that resulted in the amplifi-
cation of externally originated shocks. In light of this evidence, my view is
that although Chile-style controls on inflows may be useful, it is important
not to overemphasize their eﬀects. In countries with well-run monetary
and fiscal policies, controls on inflows will tend to work, having a positive
eﬀect. However, in countries with reckless macroeconomic policies, con-
trols on inflows will have little if any eﬀect. It is important to emphasize
that even in well-behaved countries, Chile-style controls on inflows are
likely to be useful as a short-run tool that will help implement an adequate
sequencing of reform. There are, however, some costs and dangers asso-
ciated with this policy. First, as emphasized by Valdés-Prieto and Soto
(1998) and De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes (2000), among others, they
increase the cost of capital, especially for small and midsize firms. Second,
there is always the temptation to transform these controls into a perma-
nent policy. Third, and related to the previous point, in the presence of
capital controls there is a danger that policymakers and analysts will be-
come overconfident, neglecting other key aspects of macroeconomic pol-
icy.18 This, indeed, was the case of Korea in the period leading to its crisis.
Until quite late in 1997, international analysts and local policymakers be-
lieved that, due to the existence of restrictions on capital mobility, Korea
was largely immune to a currency crisis—so much so that, after giving the
Korean banks’ and central bank’s stance the next-to-worst ratings, Gold-
man Sachs argued that because Korea had “a relatively closed capital ac-
count,” these indicators should be excluded from the computation of the
overall vulnerability index. As a consequence of this, during most of 1997
Goldman Sachs played down the extent of Korea’s problems. If, however,
it had (correctly) recognized that capital restrictions cannot truly protect
an economy from financial weaknesses, Goldman Sachs would have
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18. This point has been emphasized by Fraga (1999).
clearly anticipated the Korean debacle, as it anticipated the Thai melt-
down.
1.1.4 To Freely Float or to Super-Fix: Is That the Question?
As pointed out in section 1.1.2, an increasingly large number of analysts
agrees that, in a world of high capital mobility, middle-of-the-road ex-
change rate regimes—that is, pegged-but-adjustable and its variants—are
prone to generate instability, increasing the probability of a currency crisis.
As a result of this view, the so-called two-corner perspective on exchange
rate regimes has become increasingly popular. Generally speaking, whether
a particular country should adopt a super-fixed or a floating system will de-
pend on its specific structural characteristics, including the degree of de
facto dollarization of the financial system, the extent of labor market flexi-
bility, the nature of the pass-through coeﬃcient(s), and the country’s infla-
tionary history (Calvo 1999). In this section I discuss, in some detail, some
experiences with super-fixed and floating exchange rate regimes in emerg-
ing economies. The section is organized in three parts: I first review some of
the few experiences with super-fixed regimes—Argentina, Hong Kong, and
Panama. Although the analysis is not exhaustive and does not cover every
angle of these countries’ experiences, it deals with some of the more salient,
and less understood, aspects of these regimes. I then deal with the feasibil-
ity of floating rates in emerging economies. I do this from the perspective of
what has become to be known as “fear of floating,” or the emerging coun-
tries’ alleged proclivity to intervene in the foreign exchange market (Rein-
hart 2000). My analysis of the feasibility of freely floating rates relies heav-
ily on Mexico’s experience with floating rates since 1995. In particular, I
address three specific issues: (a) Has Mexico’s exchange rate been “exces-
sively volatile” since the peso was floated? (b) To what extent have exchange
rate movements aﬀected the conduct of Mexico’s monetary policy (that is,
can we identify a monetary feedback rule)? (c) What has been the relation-
ship between exchange rate and interest rate movements?
Super-Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes: Myths and Realities
Supporters of super-fixed regimes—currency boards and dollariza-
tion—have argued that these exchange rate systems provide credibility,
transparency, very low inflation, and monetary and financial stability
(Calvo 1999, Hanke and Schuler 1998, Hausmann 2000). A particularly at-
tractive feature of super-fixed regimes is that, in principle, by reducing spec-
ulation and devaluation risk, they make domestic interest rates lower and
more stable than under alternative regimes.
If, as Calvo (1999) has conjectured, the nature of external shocks is not
independent of the exchange rate regime, and countries with more credible
regimes face milder shocks, super-fixed economies will tend to be less prone
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Fig. 1.4 Currency versus country risk premiums: Argentina, 1994–99
to contagion and thus will tend to have lower and more stable interest rates.
This, combined with enhanced credibility and financial stability, will, in
turn, result in an environment that will be more conducive to long-term
growth. This argument would be greatly reinforced if the diﬀerent risk pre-
miums, and in particular the currency and country premiums, are related
among themselves. Indeed, if this is the case a lower exchange rate risk will
be translated into a lower country risk premium and a lower cost of capital
for the country in question. In figure 1.4 I use weekly data, from 1994
through the end of 1999, to plot Argentina’s currency  risk premium—mea-
sured as the spread between peso- and dollar-denominated deposit rates—
against Argentina’s country risk premium, measured as the spread of the
country’s par Brady bonds. As may be seen, this diagram does suggest that
these two risk premiums have been positively related.
Even for countries with a super-fixed exchange rate regime achieving
credibility is not automatic, however. For this type of regime actually to be
credible, some key issues have to be addressed successfully:
• Fiscal solvency. In the stronger version of super-fixed models this is
taken care of almost automatically, because the authorities understand
that they have no alternative but to run a sustainable fiscal policy. This
is because the authorities are aware of the fact that the traditional re-
course of reducing the real value of the public debt through a surprised
devaluation is no longer available. This imposed fiscal responsibility is,
in fact, considered to be one of the most positive aspects of the super-
fixed regime. However, for the system to be eﬃcient the fiscal require-
ment also has to include specific operational aspects, including the in-
stitutional ability to run countercyclical fiscal policies.
• The lender-of-last-resort function, which under flexible and pegged-
but-adjustable regimes is provided by the central bank, has to be dele-
gated to some other institution. This may be a consortium of foreign
banks, with which a contingent credit is contracted, a foreign country
with which a monetary treaty has been signed, or a multilateral insti-
tution.
• Related to the previous point, in a super-fixed regime the domestic
banking sector has to be particularly solid in order to minimize the fre-
quency of banking crises. This can be tackled in a number of ways, in-
cluding implementing appropriate supervision, imposing high liquid-
ity requirements on banks, or having a major presence of first-rate
international banks in the domestic banking sector.
• Currency board regimes require that the monetary authority hold
enough reserves, an amount that, in fact, exceeds the monetary base.
Whether the authorities should hold large reserves under dollarization
is still a matter of debate. What is clear, however, is that dollarization
does not mean that the holding of reserves should be zero. In fact, it
may be argued that in this context, international reserves are an im-
portant component of a self-insurance program.
According to models in the Mundell-Fleming tradition—including some
modern versions, such as Chang and Velasco (2000)—a limitation of super-
fixed regimes is that negative external shocks tend to be amplified. More-
over, to the extent that it is diﬃcult to engineer relative price changes, these
external shocks will have a tendency to be translated into financial turmoil,
economic slowdown, and higher unemployment. The actual magnitude of
this eﬀect will, again, depend on the structure of the economy and, in par-
ticular, on the degree of labor-market flexibility. Some authors have recently
argued, however, that these costs have been exaggerated and that, in fact,
relative price changes between tradable and nontradable goods can be
achieved through “simulated devaluations,” including the simultaneous im-
position of (uniform) import tariﬀs and export subsidies.19 Calvo (1999, 21)
has gone so far as to argue that the existence of nominal price rigidity may
be a blessing in disguise, because it allows adjustment in profits to occur
slowly, smoothing the business cycle.
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19. See Calvo (1999). From a practical perspective, however, there are important limits to
this option. In particular, it will violate World Trade Organization regulations. Additionally,
the use of commercial policy to engineer relative price adjustments will have serious political
economy implications. On the equivalence of this type of commercial policy package and ex-
change rate adjustments, see Edwards (1988, 31–32).
Argentina’s Currency Board
Argentina provides one of the most interesting (recent) cases of a super-
fixed regime. In early 1991, and after a long history of macroeconomics
mismanagement, two bouts of hyperinflation, and depleted credibility,
Argentina adopted a currency board. This program, which was led by
Ministry of Economics Domingo Cavallo, was seen by many as a last-resort
measure for achieving credibility and stability. After a rocky start—includ-
ing serious contagion stemming from the Mexican crisis in 1995—the new
system became consolidated during the year 1996–97. Inflation plum-
meted, and by 1996 it had virtually disappeared; in 1999 and 2000 the coun-
try, in fact, faced deflation. At the time Argentina adopted a currency
board, the public had largely lost all confidence in the peso. In fact, by the
late 1980s the U.S. dollar had become the unit of account, and a very large
number of transactions was documented and carried on in dollars.
In Argentina, the lender-of-last-resort issue has been addressed in three
ways. First, banks are required to hold a very high “liquidity requirement.”
Second, the Central Bank has negotiated a substantial contingent credit
line with a consortium of international banks. Third, there has been a
tremendous increase in international banks’ presence: seven of Argentina’s
eight largest banks are currently owned by major international banks.20
After the adoption of the currency board and the rapid decline in inflation,
the country experienced a major growth recovery, posting solid rates of
growth in 1991–94. In 1995, however, and largely as a consequence of the
Mexican Tequila crisis, the country went into a severe recession, with nega-
tive growth of 3 percent. It recovered in 1996–97, only to fall once again into
a recession in 1998–99, this time aﬀected by the Russian and Brazilian cur-
rency crises and by increasing doubts about the country’s ability to deal with
its fiscal and external problems. In 1999 GDP contracted by almost 4 percent,
and in 2000 it posted modest growth. The combination of these external
shocks and some structural weaknesses—including an extremely rigid labor
legislation—resulted in a very high rate of unemployment. It exceeded 17 per-
cent in 1995–96, and it has averaged almost 15 percent during 1999–2000.
Contrary to the simplest version of the model, exchange rate risk did not
disappear after Argentina adopted a currency board. This is illustrated in
figure 1.5, where a weekly time series of interest rate diﬀerential between
peso- and dollar-denominated thirty-day deposits paid by Argentine banks
from 1993 through October 1999 is presented. As may be seen, this diﬀer-
ential experienced a major jump immediately after the Tequila crisis, ex-
ceeding 1,400 basis points. Although it subsequently declined, it continued
to be very high and volatile. During the first ten months of 1999, for ex-
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20. These eight banks, in turn, account for approximately 50 percent of deposits.
ample, the thirty-day peso-dollar interest rate diﬀerential averaged 140 ba-
sis points.
Since 1996, Argentine (real) domestic interest rates have been relatively
high and volatile. Indeed, and as may be seen in figure 1.6, since 1997 the
ninety-day deposit rate in Argentina has been higher, on average, than in
Chile, a country that has followed a policy of increased exchange rate flexi-
bility. This figure also shows that, except for a short period in 1998, Ar-
gentina’s ninety-day interest rates have been more volatile than Chile’s
equivalent rates. Furthermore, during the last three months of 1999 and
most of 2000, Argentine real interest rates exceeded those in Mexico, the
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Fig. 1.5 Argentina, interest rate diﬀerential between peso- and dollar-denominated
deposits (weekly data, 1993–99)
Fig. 1.6 Argentina: Equilibrium and actual trade-weighted real exchange rates,
1985–99 (Goldman Sachs estimates)
Latin American country with the longest experience with floating rates (see
the next subsection for a discussion of Mexico). In the last few years, and
even after the currency board had been consolidated, Argentina’s country
risk—measured, for example, by the spread of its Brady Bonds—has also
been high and volatile.
Vulnerability and Contagion. As noted above, supporters of super-fixed
regimes have argued that to the extent that the regime is credible, the coun-
try in question will be less vulnerable to external shocks and contagion. This
proposition is diﬃcult to test, since it is not trivial to build an appropriate
counterfactual. What can be done, however, is to compare the extent to
which countries that are somewhat similar—except for the exchange rate
regime—are aﬀected by common international shocks. Such an exercise
was described in section 1.1.3 of this paper for the case of domestic interest
rates in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The results obtained clearly indicate
that a 1–standard deviation shock to Latin America’s regional risk pre-
mium aﬀected Argentina’s domestic interest rates significantly. Also, in a
recent five-country study on the international transmission of financial
volatility using switching ARCH techniques, Edwards and Susmel (2000)
found that Argentina has been the country most seriously aﬀected by
volatility contagion: the other countries in the study are Brazil, Chile, Mex-
ico, and Hong Kong. Interestingly enough, this study also found that Hong
Kong, the most revered of the super-fixers, has also been subject to impor-
tant volatility contagion during the last five years.
Competitiveness, Fiscal Policy, and Credibility. Analysts have emphasized
two factors as possible explanations for Argentina’s financial instability
during the last few years: an accumulated RER overvaluation and an in-
ability to bring the fiscal accounts under control.
Figure 1.6 presents Goldman Sachs’ estimation of Argentina’s equilib-
rium RER as well as its actual (trade-weighted) RER for 1985–99.21 In this
figure, if the equilibrium RER exceeds the actual RER, the currency is over-
valued. As may be seen, according to these calculations, Argentina suﬀered
a significant overvaluation until early 1999. Independently of the actual rel-
evance and accuracy of these specific estimates, the belief that Argentina
had accumulated a significant RER disequilibrium had a negative eﬀect on
expectations and the regime’s degree of credibility.
Since 1996 Argentina has run increasingly larger fiscal deficits and has
systematically exceeded its own—and successive IMF programs’—deficit
targets. This has resulted in a rapidly growing public-sector debt and in
swelling external financing requirements. These two factors, plus the slow
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21. This equilibrium RER is estimated using a method similar to the one discussed in sec-
tion 1.1.2 of this paper. For details see Ades and Kaune (1998).
progress in key structural reform areas, such as labor-market legislation and
the relationship between the provinces and the federal government, have
translated into successive bouts of low credibility and instability.
Panama and Dollarization
In 1998 many analysts and politicians, including Argentina’s President
Carlos Menem, concluded that Argentina’s credibility problems could be
tackled by taking an additional step toward exchange rate super-fixity and
adopting the U.S. dollar as the sole legal tender. Supporters of this dollariza-
tion project pointed to Panama’s remarkably low inflation as living proof of
the merits of that system. What was surprising, however, was that this early
support for dollarization was not based on a serious evaluation of the Pana-
manian case. More specifically, what admirers of this experience did not
know—or did not say—was that Panama’s monetary arrangement has sur-
vived largely thanks to IMF support. In eﬀect, with the exception of a brief
interregnum during the Noriega years, Panama has been almost perma-
nently under the tutelage of the fund. Since 1973 Panama has had sixteen
IMF programs, the most recent of which was signed in late 1997, and is ex-
pected to run until late 2000. According to Mussa and Savastano (2000), dur-
ing the last quarter of a century Panama has been the most assiduous user of
IMF resources in the western hemisphere; since 1973, only Pakistan has had
a larger number of IMF programs. The main factor behind this proliferation
of IMF programs has been Panama’s inability, until very recently, to control
its public finances. Between 1973 and 1998 the fiscal deficit averaged 4 per-
cent of GDP, and during 1973–87—a period of continuous IMF programs—
it exceeded a remarkable 7 percent of GDP. In fact, it has only been in the last
few years that Panama has been able to put its fiscal accounts in order.
In 1904 Panama adopted the dollar as legal tender. Although there is a na-
tional currency, the balboa, its role is largely symbolic. There is no central
bank, and the monetary authorities cannot issue balboa-denominate notes.
Since 1970 Panama has had no controls on capital mobility and has been fi-
nancially integrated to the rest of the world. Moreover, for decades Panama
has been an important center for oﬀshore banking, with a large number of
international banks operating in the country. This, of course, has allowed
Panama to face successfully the lender-of-last-resort issue. Panama’s most
remarkable achievement is its very low rate of inflation. Between 1955 and
1998, it averaged 2.4 percent per annum, and during the 1990s it barely ex-
ceeded 1 percent per year. In addition to low inflation, Panama has posted a
healthy rate of growth during the last four decades. Between 1958 and 1998,
Panama’s real GDP expanded at 5.3 percent per year, and during the 1990s,
growth has been a full percentage point higher than that of the Latin Amer-
ican countries as a group—4.4 versus 3.4 percent per year.
As pointed out, however, behind these achievements hides Panama’s se-
rious historical addiction to IMF financing. In spite of not having a central
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bank or a currency of its own, for years Panama failed to maintain fiscal dis-
cipline. Initially, these large fiscal deficits were financed through borrowing
from abroad, and when the foreign debt became too high, the IMF stepped
in with fresh resources. When this was not enough, Panama restructured its
foreign debt. Panama had its first IMF Stand-By program in 1965. A year
later, adjustment was achieved, and the fiscal deficit was brought into
check. In 1968, however, the fiscal accounts were again out of hand, and the
IMF was called in once more. A remarkable nineteen-year period of unin-
terrupted IMF programs was thus initiated. Although in some of the early
programs there were no withdrawals, the sheer presence of the IMF sig-
naled that, in case of need, the monies would indeed be there.
Year after year, a new IMF program called for the strengthening of public
finances. Invariably, year after year, Panama failed to take serious action.
After all, the authorities knew that the IMF was there, ready to bail them
out. This vicious circle was only broken in 1987, when as a result of General
Noriega’s confrontational policies and involvement in narcotics traﬃcking,
Panama was subject to severe United States–led economic sanctions. The
IMF returned to Panama in September of 1990 with a monitored program.
This was followed by lending programs in 1992 (twenty-two months), 1995
(sixteen months), and 1997 (thirty-six months). Significantly, in the last few
years the authorities have finally acknowledged the need to maintain a solid
fiscal position. Between 1990 and 1996 the country posted public-sector
surpluses, and in the last three years it has run modest deficits.
In contrast with Argentina, Panama has successfully eliminated devalu-
ation risk. This has been reflected in a relatively low cost of capital in inter-
national financial markets. In that regard, it is illustrative to compare the
spreads over U.S. Treasuries of Brady bonds issued by Panama and Ar-
gentina. Between January 1997 and December 1998 the average daily
spread on Panamanian par bonds was 464 basis points, significantly lower
than that of Argentine par Brady bonds, which averaged 710 basis points.
It is very important to note, however, that although there is no devalua-
tion risk in Panama, the country has continued to be subject to sizable
country risk and to contagion. In fact, as figure 1.7 shows, the spread over
Treasuries of Panamanian Brady bonds has been volatile and has experi-
enced important jumps in response to political shocks—such as the uncer-
tainty over the president’s intentions to perpetuate himself in power in
1998—and external developments, including the Russian crisis of 1998.
More to the point, the spread over Panamanian bonds has systematically
been higher than that of Chile’s sovereign bond, and Chile, as has been
pointed out, is a country that during the period under discussion experi-
enced an overall increase in the degree of exchange rate flexibility. A careful
study of Panama’s monetary history suggests that dollarization does not,
on its own, assure fiscal solvency and prudence. This has to be accom-
plished through the creation of budget-related institutions.
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Until recently, much of the discussion on dollarization has focused on the
loss of seigniorage that would result from unilateral dollarization. Sup-
porters of dollarization have argued that the way to deal with the seignior-
age issue is to sign a monetary treatise with the United States, under which
lost seigniorage would be partially refunded to Argentina. This is not a new
idea. In fact, it was proposed in 1972 by Harry Johnson within the context
of the Panamanian experience. Such an initiative, however, is likely to face
serious political problems. This said, however, it is important to notice that
early in the year 2000 legislation aimed at sharing seigniorage in case of
dollarization was introduced to the U.S. Senate. The bill, sponsored by
Florida’s senior senator Connie Mack, establishes specific criteria to be
used to calculate what percentage of seigniorage would be transferred to the
emerging market in question. In my opinion, however, it is highly unlikely
that this bill will be passed any time soon.
On the Feasibility of Floating Exchange Rates in Emerging Economies:
Lessons from Mexico
For many years it has been argued that emerging countries cannot suc-
cessfully adopt a freely floating exchange rate regime. Two reasons have
traditionally been given for this position: first, it has been argued that be-
cause emerging countries tend to export commodities or light manufac-
tures, a floating exchange rate would be “excessively” volatile. Second, and
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Fig. 1.7 Panama Brady bonds spreads (daily data, December 1994–May 1999)
related to the previous point, it has been argued that emerging countries
don’t have the institutional requirements to undertake eﬀective monetary
policy under purely floating exchange rates (Summers 2000). According to
this perspective, emerging markets that float would be unable to implement
the type of (rather complex) feedback rule required for implementing an
eﬀective inflation targeting system. In particular, it has been argued that
countries that float after a currency crisis will be unable to stabilize the value
of their currency. This view is expressed by Eichengreen and Masson (1998,
18–19), who, after discussing the merits of floating rates and inflation tar-
geting, state:
[I]t is questionable whether a freely floating exchange rate and an infla-
tion target objective for monetary policy are feasible, advisable or fully
credible for many developing and transition economies . . . [T]hese
economies are subject to substantial larger internal and external
shocks . . . and the transmission mechanisms through which monetary
policy aﬀects the economy and the price level tend to be less certain and
reliable.
More recently, a new objection to floating in emerging markets has been
raised. Some authors, most notably Calvo (1999), Reinhart (2000), and
their associates, have argued that in a world with high capital mobility, in-
complete information, fads, rumors, and dollar-denominated liabilities, the
monetary authorities will be severely aﬀected by a fear of floating. This is
because significant exchange rate movements, and in particular large de-
preciations, will tend to have negative eﬀects on inflation and on corporate
debt. According to this view, floating regimes in emerging markets will be
so only in name. In reality, countries that claim to float will be “closet peg-
gers,” making every eﬀort, through direct intervention (selling and buying
reserves) and interest rate manipulation, to avoid large exchange rate fluc-
tuations. These countries will be in the worst of worlds: they will have de
facto rigid exchange rates and high interest rates. Reinhart (2000, 65) has
aptly summarized the fear-of-floating view:
Countries that say that they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do
not; there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear of floating.” Relative to
more committed floaters . . . exchange rate volatility is quite low . . .
[T]his low relative–exchange rate volatility is the deliberate result of pol-
icy actions to stabilize the exchange rate.
After analyzing the behavior of exchange rate, international reserves, and
nominal interest rate volatility, Reinhart concludes that those emerging
markets usually considered to be floaters—Bolivia, India, and Mexico—
are subject to the fear-of-floating syndrome. She goes on to argue that, un-
der these circumstances, “lack of credibility remains a serious problem,”
and that the only way to avoid it may be “full dollarization” (69).
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In a recent paper, Levy and Sturzenegger (2000) follow (independently)
an approach similar to that proposed by Reinhart (2000) to analyze ex-
change rate policy in emerging economies. These authors use data on the
volatility of international reserves, the volatility of exchange rates, and the
volatility of exchange rate changes for ninety-nine countries, during the pe-
riod 1990–98, to determine their true exchange rate regime. Their analysis
begins with the well-known fact that the classification system used by the
IMF tends to misclassify countries. The authors undertake a series of clus-
ter analysis exercises to classify the countries in their sample into five cate-
gories: (a) fixed, (b) dirty float or crawling peg, (c) dirty float, (d) float, and
(e) inconclusive. The results from this study tend to contradict the fear-of-
floating hypothesis. Indeed, Levy and Sturzenegger find out that for their
complete sample, 273 cases out of a total of 955 can be classified as floaters.
This, of course, does not mean that a number of countries are wrongly clas-
sified according to the IMF. For example, they find that in 1998 there were
twelve countries that had been classified as floaters by the fund but that did
not really float. Interestingly enough, there were also some fixers that did
not fix.
Some of the emerging countries that, according to this study, had a float-
ing regime during 1997–98 (the last two years of their sample) include Chile,
Colombia, Ghana, India, and South Africa. A particularly important case
is Mexico, a country whose authorities have strongly claimed to have
adopted a freely floating rate after the collapse of 1994. The Levy and
Sturzenegger analysis indeed suggests that, after a transitional period in the
two years immediately following the currency crisis, Mexico has had, since
1997, a freely floating exchange rate regime. According to this study, during
1995 Mexico had a dirty or crawling peg regime. This evolved, in 1996, to a
dirty float and, finally, in 1997 to a free float. This means, then, that Mex-
ico’s experience can indeed be used as an illustration of the way in which a
floating regime will tend to work in an emerging country. Of course, it is not
possible to extract general conclusions from a single episode, but in the ab-
sence of other experiences with anything that resembles a floating rate,
analyses of Mexico’s foray into exchange rate flexibility should prove very
useful.
Figure 1.8 presents weekly data on the nominal exchange rate of the Mex-
ican peso vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar for the period January 1992 through Oc-
tober 1999. The top panel depicts the nominal peso-dollar rate, and the bot-
tom panel presents the weekly rate of devaluation of the Mexican peso
during that period. These figures clearly show the heightened volatility that
followed the currency crisis of December 1994. By late 1995, however, Mex-
ico had managed to stabilize the peso-dollar rate. During the second of No-
vember, 1995 the peso-dollar rate was at 7.77, and almost two years later,
during the second week of October 1997, it was 7.71. At that time, and par-
tially as a result of the East Asian crisis, the peso depreciated significantly.
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The peso continued to lose ground until October 1998, when in the midst of
the global liquidity squeeze the peso-dollar rate surpassed 10. Once global
liquidity was restored the peso strengthened significantly, as the figure
shows, and during October-November 1999 it fluctuated around the 9.3 to
9.4 mark. At the time of this writing, September 2000, the peso-dollar rate
continues to fluctuate around that level.
Volatility
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present a series of indicators to compare the volatility
of the peso-dollar rate with the rates of the deutsche mark, Japanese yen,
British pound, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and New Zealand dollar
Exchange Rate Regimes 65
A
Fig. 1.8 A, Mexican peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate: spot exchange rate (weekly
data, January 1992–October 1999); B, Mexican peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate: rate












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to the U.S. dollar, as well as the French franc-deutsche mark rate. While
table 1.4 deals with daily exchange rate data, table 1.5 presents volatility sta-
tistics for weekly data. Generally speaking, the results presented in these
tables provide no support for either the idea that the peso-dollar rate has
been “excessively” volatile after 1995 nor for the notion that the Mexican
peso has been “abnormally” stable. In fact, according to the mean absolute
percentage change and the standard deviation of change, the peso-dollar
rate was as volatile as the other currencies during 1997. In 1998, its degree
of volatility increased significantly but was lower than the yen-dollar rate.
In 1999 the extent of volatility declined, and the peso was once again in the
middle of the pack. The overall conclusion from the high-frequency volatil-
ity analysis is, then, that Mexico does not appear to be diﬀerent, in terms of
volatility, from other floaters.
Monetary Policy, Feedback Rules, and Transparency
The stabilization of the exchange rate at around 7.7 pesos per dollar in
1996 surprised many analysts, for two reasons. First, with a still rapid rate
of inflation it was expected that the peso would continue to depreciate at a
somewhat rapid pace. Second, the Bank of Mexico stated repeatedly that it
was (almost completely) abstaining from intervening in the foreign ex-
change market. In fact the Bank of Mexico stated that between 1996–97 it
never sold foreign exchange, and only on very few occasions it provided sig-
nals to the local financial market, suggesting that it would tighten liquidity.
No “signals,” were provided during 1997.22
Market participants, however, were skeptical about the hands-oﬀ policy
allegedly followed by the Bank of Mexico and believed that, as is often the
case in industrial countries, there was a gap between what the Bank of Mex-
ico said and what it actually did. In particular, by mid-1997 market analysts
believed that the Bank of Mexico was following a complex monetary policy
feedback rule that incorporated exchange rate behavior prominently. The
chief economist of Bear Sterns stated in The Wall Street Journal: “Mexico
stopped its economic and financial deterioration almost overnight [in the
aftermath of the 1994 devaluation] by announcing a feedback mechanism
between the exchange rate . . . and . . . monetary liquidity” (20 October
1997, A.23). Moreover, JPMorgan’s Emerging Markets Data Watch of 3 Oc-
tober 1997 (page 6) noted that “It has often been argued in the past year or
two that Banxico has been exacerbating upward pressure on the peso by
tightening monetary policy.” These analysts did not venture to opine on
whether the feedback rule was of a Taylor type or whether it was of a looser,
and yet more complex, type, such as the ones advocated by supporters of in-
flation targeting in an open economy (Svensson 1999).
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22. See Edwards and Savastano (1999) for a detailed discussion of the bank of Mexico’s oﬃ-
cial description of the way it conducted monetary policy during that period. See also Aguilar
and Juan-Ramon (1997).
Between 1995 and 1999, when an inflation-targeting approach was
adopted, the Bank of Mexico’s oﬃcial monetary policy consisted of target-
ing the monetary base on a day-to-day basis.23 No attempt was made, ac-
cording to the oﬃcial view, at targeting interest rates, nor was the exchange
rate a consideration in setting liquidity (O’Dogherty 1997). This system was
supposed to work as follows: Early in the year the Bank of Mexico an-
nounced the day-to-day target for monetary base. This, in turn, was consis-
tent with the oﬃcial inflation goal, and incorporated expected changes in
money demand and seasonality. If, for whatever reason, the Bank decided
to alter its stance it did that by sending a signal to the banking sector. This
was done by announcing, and thereafter enforcing, a (very) small change in
the banking system cumulative balances (O’Dogherty 1997). What puzzled
Mexico observers was the small number of episodes in which the Bank of
Mexico acknowledged having modified the stance of its monetary policy in
response to market developments. By its own reckoning, the Bank of Mex-
ico changed the stance of monetary policy fifteen times between 25 Sep-
tember and 25 December 1995 and eight times between December 1995 and
November 1996, and it kept the stance unchanged (at a “neutral” level—
i.e., a cumulative balance of zero) during 1997 (Gil-Díaz 1997; Aguilar and
Juan-Ramón 1997). According to Mexico’s monetary authorities, then, all
movements of interest rates and the exchange rate in, say, 1997 (or in any
other long period between changes in the Bank of Mexico’s objective for the
system’s cumulative balance) did not justify or elicit a response of monetary
policy. Edwards and Savastasno (1998) used weekly data to investigate
whether, as stated, the Bank of Mexico followed a mostly hands-oﬀ mone-
tary policy, or, as market participants suspected, it followed some type of
feedback rule. Their findings suggest, very strongly, that during 1996–97 the
Bank of Mexico did follow a monetary policy feedback rule, according to
which developments in the exchange rate market were explicitly taken into
account when the amount of liquidity made available to the market was de-
termined. More specifically, the authors found that the Bank of Mexico
tightened the monetary base, relative to its target, when the peso experi-
enced a “large” depreciation. This analysis indicates that, although mone-
tary policy responded to changes in the peso-dollar exchange rate, the Bank
of Mexico did not defend a specific level of the peso.
These results are important for five reasons: First, they clearly indicate
that, contrary to the Mexican authorities’ claims, the central bank made a
concerted eﬀort to stabilize the peso. Second, the results also show that this
intervention was not undertaken directly through the foreign exchange
market; instead, daily decision on monetary policy were aﬀected by ex-
change rate developments. Third, the results also suggest that, in spite of the
skeptic’s view, in emerging economies it is possible for the monetary au-
thority to implement an eﬀective and complex feedback rule, of an aug-
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23. The discussion that follows is partially based on Edwards and Savastano (1999).
mented Taylor type.24 Fourth, they suggest that during this period the Bank
of Mexico was concerned with the inflationary implications of exchange
rate movements. No attempt was made at defending a particular level of the
exchange rate. Fifth, these results clearly illustrate that under a floating
regime the issue of transparency—and, more specifically, of verifiability—
can be serious, and even highly destabilizing. In the case of the Mexican
peso discussed above, the Economist (14–18 March 1998, 17) pointed out
that puzzled investors were not sure how to interpret the relative stability of
the peso during 1997:
[D]istrustful investors have wondered aloud whether the central bank—
which lost much credibility with the collapse—really enjoys independ-
ence. . . . [T]he doubters have noted that the government’s policy on the
peso, which is theoretically free to float, has actually been set by a com-
mittee.
Calvo (1999) has persuasively argued that, to the extent that there are
poorly informed participants in the market for emerging market debt, the
lack of transparency and credibility of the authorities will leave these coun-
tries open to speculation based on rumors and herd instinct. These, in turn,
can easily result in major attacks on the currency. Frankel, Schmukler, and
Serven (2000) have recently discussed the issue of exchange rate and mone-
tary policy verifiability. According to them, under most circumstances it is
diﬃcult and costly for analysts, even for very sophisticated ones, to actually
verify whether a particular country is, in fact, following the policies that it
has announced. This view is certainly supported by the work on Mexico dis-
cussed above; it took Edwards and Savastano (1999) a substantial amount
of time and some detective-type work to unearth the Bank of Mexico reac-
tion function. The above discussion does not mean that emerging countries
should avoid complex feedback rules or should abstain from floating. What
it underscores, however, is the need to communicate to the public, in as
transparent a way as possible, the type of policy that is being followed (see
Bernanke et al. 1999 for a discussion of monetary authorities’ communica-
tion strategies within an inflation-targeting context).
Mexican Lessons and Fear of Floating
As pointed out, according to the fear-of-floating hypothesis, rather than
letting the exchange rate fluctuate freely, emerging markets will intervene
actively in the domestic financial market, generating a “rigid exchange rate–
cum–high interest rates” situation. This point of view has been expressed,
very forcefully, by the Inter-American Development Bank’s chief econo-
mist, Ricardo Hausmann (2000). According to him, depreciations of the
Mexican peso have been followed by hikes in interest rates, reflecting mas-
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24. Naturally, as pointed out above, it is diﬃcult to make general statements on the basis of
one historical case. Nonetheless, Mexico’s experience is very useful.
sive government intervention, and thus an intense fear of floating. This sit-
uation, Hausman has argued, contrasts with countries such as Australia,
where the currency has (recently) depreciated, while domestic interest rates
have remained relatively stable.
Although Mexico has indeed adjusted its monetary policy in response to
(some) exchange rate developments, there is little evidence suggesting that,
since 1997, it has been subject to a significant fear of floating. Figure 1.9
presents weekly data on the peso-dollar nominal exchange rate and on the
nominal interest rate on twenty-eight-day government securities (CETES)
between 1994 and October of 1999. Table 1.6, on the other hand, presents
correlation coeﬃcients between these two variables for diﬀerent subperi-
ods. As may be seen from this table, the alleged strong positive relationship
between the peso-dollar exchange rate and the nominal interest rate on gov-
ernment securities is confined to a rather short subperiod. In eﬀect, between
January 1996 and October 1997—when Mexico, as well as the rest of Latin
America, was aﬀected by the East Asian crisis—these two variables were
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Fig. 1.9 Mexico exchange rate and twenty-eight-day nominal interest rate (cetes;
weekly data, 1994–99)
Table 1.6 Correlation Coeﬃcients Between Mexico’s Exchange Rate and Nominal
Interest Rate: Weekly Data, 1996–99
Period Correlation Coeﬃcient
January 1996–October 1997 –0.60
November 1997–May 1998 0.04
June 1998–April 1999 0.83
May 1999–October 1999 0.08
January 1996–October 1999 0.08
Source: Computed by the author using data from the Datastream database.
negatively correlated. Between November 1997 and May 1998, Mexico
looked a lot like Australia, as the peso depreciated significantly (an accu-
mulated 15.4 percent) with stable interest rates. During this period, which
corresponds to the first five months in oﬃce of a new Central Bank gover-
nor, the correlation between the two variables was virtually zero.
After the Russian crisis of August 1998 and the subsequent dry-up of
global liquidity, the peso and Mexican domestic interest rates did, indeed,
exhibit a positive correlation. At that time, due to a severe attack on the cur-
rency, the Mexican authorities decided that this was a temporary situation
and that allowing the peso to weaken further would compromise the infla-
tion target. This type of reaction is indeed what a modern and forward-
looking inflation-targeting model would indicate (Bernanke et al. 1999).
Indeed, in an elegant recent paper Svensson (1999) has developed an
inflation-targeting framework that allows for this type of nonlinear, thresh-
old-triggered reaction and judgment-aided reaction to occur.
In retrospect, it is diﬃcult to believe that, had Mexico had a super-fixed
exchange rate regime, it would have been able to face the 1998 global liq-
uidity squeeze more eﬀectively. After all, during 1999 the economic recov-
ery continued, inflation was on target, employment grew at healthy rates,
and interest rates declined significantly. Moreover, broadly speaking, the
exchange rate has gone back to approximately its precrisis level. It should
be emphasized, however, that Mexico’s successful experience of the last few
years does not mean that every country that floats will behave in this way. It
does mean, however, that the fear of floating is not as pervasive as claimed.
It does also mean that not every monetary policy feedback rule is detri-
mental to the country’s well-being. If implemented correctly, and supported
by the right type of fiscal policy, these rules can be very useful in improving
macroeconomic management.
1.1.5 Concluding Remarks
The emerging markets’ financial crises of the second half of the 1990s
have changed economists’ views with respect to exchange rate policies. An
increasing number of analysts in academia as well as in the oﬃcial and
private sectors argue that pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate regimes are
unstable and invite speculation. This view has been taken by the U.S. secre-
tary of state, as well as by the Metzler Commission Report. According to
this perspective, in order to reduce the probability of financial crises coun-
tries should move to one of the two-corner exchange rate systems: freely
floating exchange rates or super-fixed regimes. In this paper I have analyzed
the problems and challenges associated with this policy perspective, in-
cluding issues related to optimal exit policies and exchange rate feedback
rules under floating regimes. Although it is too early to make a definitive
statement, the evidence discussed in this paper suggests that, under the ap-
propriate conditions and policies, floating exchange rates can be eﬀective
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and eﬃcient. Indeed, much of the criticism of floating rates in the emerging
economies seems to be based on a small number of historical episodes, or
has misread the diﬃculties associated with super-fixed systems. Having said
that, I will add that it appears to be reasonable to expect that in the years to
come the number of currencies in the world will decline. Many countries are
likely to realize that they satisfy the “optimal currency area criteria.” This,
however, is not likely to be an appropriate solution for every emerging na-
tion.
Some analysts have argued that the control of capital inflows is an eﬀec-
tive way of helping to prevent currency crises. In section 1.1.3 of this paper
I have evaluated Chile’s experience with this type of policy. My conclusion
is that, although these controls were useful in Chile, their eﬀectiveness has
been exaggerated. In particular, there is no guarantee that they will work in
the same way as in Chile in other nations that adopt them.
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2. Domingo F. Cavallo
Thank you. I prefer to start talking about money as an institution. As a
politician who has had to deal with practical issues in government, I came
to the conclusion that economic growth is related much more to the quality
of institutions, particularly monetary institutions, than to exchange rate
regimes.
In adopting rules of the game for an economy, it is very important to
think in terms of the institution’s ability to generate the appropriate incen-
tives for growth. Of course, once a particular institution is created, it is very
important to maintain it over time. As an institution remains and functions,
people’s understanding of its purpose increases, and the eﬀectiveness of the
institution increases as well. Good institutions are those that provide as-
surance that property rights of people will be defended as well as the rights
of human and financial capital. Good institutions are those that create the
appropriate incentives for the eﬃcient use of capital and generate higher
productivity levels over time.
Money is very important as an institution. What I see as very important
about money is its ability to inspire confidence, its ability to reassure that
those property rights that are written and documented in monetary terms
will be preserved over time. I would like to speak about the quality of money
in order to refer to the ability of a particular money to oﬀer reassurance to
somebody who has chosen that currency to write contracts that his or her
property rights will be defended. The quality of money can be observed by
looking at the existence of long-term contracts. If the interest rate is more
or less similar to the expected rate of growth of the economy, that means
that a particular money does not embody long-term inflationary expecta-
tions, that long-term inflationary expectations have been removed, and
therefore people will use that money, for example, for long-term lending or
borrowing.
In my country, after forty-five years of inflation, originated by the use and
abuse of the government’s power to print money to finance public fiscal
deficits and even private deficits, the people were convinced that our cur-
rency was not a good one and that the government would continue printing
money and taxing people’s savings. That is why, during the 1980s, Argen-
tines decided to repudiate the Argentine currency, the austral, and they
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started to use the dollar. Therefore dollarization is not something that a par-
ticular government advocated for Argentina in those days. Dollarization
was a decision made by the Argentine people during the 1980s, at a time of
high inflation and even hyperinflation. By then, there was more than $20
billion circulating in Argentina. People started to use the dollar for every-
day transactions, and of course for saving, because they did not want the
government or the Central Bank to tax away their saving and their income.
In order to inspire confidence in the monetary system, we set new rules of
the game for the economy and created a new monetary regime. We decided
that we had to allow Argentines to continue using the dollar. We could not
prohibit the use of the dollar, because if we had said “now, it is obligatory
to sell all the dollars you have to the authorities, and it is forbidden to use
the dollar any more,” no Argentine would have believed in our commitment
to maintaining a sound Argentine currency. That is why I explain that our
monetary system is not a permanent currency board, nor is it a permanent
fixed exchange rate regime. Our system is a system of competitive currencies.
We have at least two currencies, the dollar and the peso. The fixed rate of
the Argentinean currency to the dollar is a temporary one, and the currency
board is a temporary arrangement, to create confidence in our currency. In
order to encourage Argentines to use our currency, we created what we call
a convertibility plan, which is diﬀerent from a fixed exchange rate plan. We
called it a convertibility plan because what Argentines demanded was con-
vertibility for the currency that they use. The demand for convertibility for
a particular currency in the past came mainly from the negative eﬀects of in-
flation. Argentines did not want to be in a trap; they wanted to be able to
convert their currency, and therefore their wealth—their financial prop-
erty—from one currency to other currencies. Otherwise, they reasoned, the
government would eventually continue to tax away their financial wealth.
In the future, however, the demand for convertibility for a particular cur-
rency will come increasingly from globalization. In a globalized world, cap-
ital flights will be available to everyone, and individual portfolios will allow
for the easy reallocation from one currency to another. If a government tries
to force its people to use a particular currency, that will no longer be ac-
ceptable to citizens, at least in countries where there is no tradition of re-
spect for property rights.
Thus, in Argentina we have the system that we call “convertibility,” and
we will maintain the system of allowing the changing of one currency for
another forever. If the central bank, the economy minister, the president, or
even the congress were to decide that the Argentine currency should be non-
convertible, that saving in the system should be in the local currency or that
everyone would be forced to use the local currency exclusively, that would
be repudiated by the people.
Now, why fix the value of this newly created currency? At the beginning,
you create the currency and you want it to be convertible. There is no other
Exchange Rate Regimes 79
alternative but to create that currency through a currency board: that is,
fully backing the new currency to a high-quality currency (let’s say the dol-
lar) in order to assure that the currency that is being created will preserve its
value in terms of the “tutor” currency. If you look at history, most curren-
cies that now inspire confidence were created this way. That is, they were
backed by gold and convertible into gold. Also, high-quality younger cur-
rencies, such as the Singapore dollar, were created through a currency
board. It was a currency board that used the pound sterling as its support;
then it shifted to the dollar when the sterling became weaker, and then it
abandoned the use of a tutor. Also, remember that when the Singapore dol-
lar was floated it appreciated rather than depreciating.
The whole idea that you are in a totally fixed system and you cannot
abandon it is wrong. It is perfectly possible to move from a fixed system to
a floating system, if at the time of adopting a floating system there are no
forces generating a sharp devaluation, but, on the contrary, there are forces
generating the appreciation of the currency. Market forces driving a cur-
rency appreciation are likely to happen in a country that has set up a good
set of rules of the game and has set up good new institutions, because nor-
mally a country that adopts this decision starts with a very low level of pro-
ductivity in all the sectors of its economy. Thus, over a period of ten or
twenty years, productivity growth in that country should be higher than in
the country that provides the tutor currency. Therefore, there will be a time
when the market will call for an appreciation rather than a depreciation of
the domestic currency, and that is the time for exiting the fixed exchange rate
but preserving its convertibility, which is a key property that people demand
from a currency.
We expect favorable market conditions, and this is why we consider con-
vertibility very important and why the fixed exchange rate of the currency is
a temporary phenomenon. When the currency inspires enough confidence,
we will have a floating exchange rate, but the currency will still be convert-
ible, and people will have the freedom to choose that currency, the national
currency, or other currencies.
Now, has this system served Argentina well and prevented crisis? Of
course. Look at the figures of the last decade. Since the creation of the new
monetary regime, there was no currency crisis in Argentina in comparison
with the five decades previous to convertibility. The financial crises were
mild, and we overcame them easily and without big losses for the govern-
ment. In general, the growth that we achieved during the decade was fairly
high. Argentina between 1990 and the year 2000, in a period of ten years,
expanded its economy 54 percent. Of course, Chile had a larger expansion,
88 percent, but Chile had implemented many more reforms at an earlier
stage in time, and I will explain some diﬀerences in a moment. However,
compared with Mexico, which expanded its economy 36 percent, and
Brazil which expanded by 30 percent, there is no doubt the growth perfor-
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mance of Argentina was very good. Sometimes people say that a fixed ex-
change rate is bad for exports because it restricts export growth. Look at
the figures. Of course, Mexico had a huge expansion of exports, 274 per-
cent, but this was not due to the exchange rate regime: it was due to the
North American Free Trade Agreement. Argentina had 118 percent, even
more than Chile (at 103 percent), and much more than Brazil, which had
a 78 percent increase in total exports. So exports did increase during the
decade.
In addition to that, we eliminated inflation. Of course, now we are suﬀer-
ing from deflation, and that is what people perceive as a serious problem,
and no doubt it is a problem. It would have been very good if Argentina
could have floated its currency before the crisis in Brazil or the devaluation
of the euro. However, we could not have floated it during the 1990s, because
the peso’s flotation would have caused a currency crisis in Argentina be-
cause of economic circumstances. In the future, though, we expect that
there will be such a moment.
Let me make a final comment. What is the problem now in Argentina?
Some people say the currency is overvalued. Argentina is not growing and
may face a long period of stagnation and deflation. I think such statements
are wrong. Exports are expanding in Argentina. Last year, exports ex-
panded 12 percent. The problem in Argentina is that during the last three
or four years investment opportunities have fallen, for two reasons. First,
tax increases—very distortive tax increases—aﬀected the cost of capital.
Second, rumors of changes to the rules of the game threatened to reduce the
profitability of investments in the future. Therefore, investors decided to
postpone investments. A business is like a typical family, which, when faced
with uncertainty about future income, does not demand loans for purchas-
ing a home or a car. My point is that investment was discouraged in Ar-
gentina because of the government’s tax increases, not because of the value
of the currency itself. Thus, we should not introduce changes to our mone-
tary system, but we should remove these disincentives for investment that
deter investment and produce a significant burst of new investments that
will generate productivity increases. This way, the Argentine economy will
reinitiate a vigorous growth at the same pace it grew in the early 1990s.
3. Arminio Fraga
We are talking here this weekend about exchange rate crises and financial
crises in emerging markets. I will give you a brief summary of what I believe
are the main factors that one should look for in understanding such crises
based on my academic, policy, and market experience.
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My view is that most crisis situations have as a basic feature weak balance
sheets. The weakness can be found at the government level or in the private
sector, and it typically includes situations in which countries or banking
sectors borrow short-term to finance development or long-term invest-
ments. The interesting question, therefore, is what causes weak balance
sheets? The answer can be split into micro and macro reasons. On the micro
side—the topic of our next session, with Frederic S. Mishkin’s paper—we
must discuss financial regimes, including banking, corporate governance is-
sues, and so on. On the macro side, the range of topics covered includes
weak fiscal regimes, which are the root cause of many crises, and also prob-
lems with monetary regimes and exchange rate regimes. (I will use the last
two terms to refer to the same thing.) In the end, there can only be one nom-
inal anchor, as we know.
Let me begin with a classification of exchange rate regimes. I will use the
word fixed for super-fixed. Fixed to me means that there is a clear commit-
ment, perhaps institutionalized through a currency board or a regional
agreement. This diﬀers from what Domingo Cavallo was saying. His em-
phasis was more on convertibility, and I think the policy debate in the liter-
ature has tended to focus more on fixity, rather than convertibility. Managed
will be the second of three regimes, one in which there is a target. It can be
a target rate or band or path or whatever. Floating will then be everything
else where there is no target, but where some degree of intervention or lean-
ing against the wind may be allowed, provided there is no target. There must
really be no target, whether it be announced or not, which is something that
is not easy to verify.
I tend to believe with Jeﬀrey Frankel, who gave a beautiful lecture at the
Central Bank of Brazil just this past week, that it is possible to manage
something between the extremes. It is not a theoretical impossibility. One
could, for example, have a target zone or band. When the exchange rate is
inside the band, there may be more room to run an independent monetary
policy than when the rate is close to the band, where it becomes more like a
fixed exchange rate. The problem is, and as this little example shows, that it
gets to be complicated, a notion I will get back to. Also, I believe running
an intermediate regime requires a lot of virtue. By that I mean, for example,
Asian saving rates, which allow for a lot of flexibility in the conduct of pol-
icy, allowing for more room for mistakes.
Let me now be a bit provocative: my view on exchange rate regimes is not
that we cannot run intermediate regimes, but that we should not. The rea-
son is, basically, that they lead to two kinds of trouble. One problem is that
they lead to confusion, and by that I mean confusion by private agents, by
society, particularly when they structure their balance sheets. In an inter-
mediate regime, it isn’t clear what sort of risk one is subject to (e.g., interest
rate risk in a fixed exchange rate regime or exchange rate risk in a floating
regime). This may lead to temporarily overoptimistic or pessimistic beliefs,
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which are part of human nature and part of markets and therefore may lead
to a crisis-prone environment. A second problem with intermediate regimes
is that they lead to temptation. Here I am mainly thinking about govern-
ments and the temptation to postpone adjustment, to hide things, to, in a
way, avoid facing reality. The problem is related to something I alluded to
when I was here three years ago, which is the typically short horizon with
which many governments tend to work, due to electoral cycles and so forth,
or what academics would call a time-consistency problem. Thus, to sum-
marize, confusion and temptation are good reasons in my view to avoid the
intermediate regimes.
The recent Brazilian crisis illustrates some of the points discussed above,
which suggest that one is better oﬀ with clean, transparent policies. Imme-
diately after the crisis and the floating of the real, the main questions we
asked ourselves were whether to float—to which the answer was yes—and
how to go about it.
First of all, it was crucial to make sure that a floating exchange rate would
not be inconsistent with our goal of providing a long-term, stable environ-
ment for the development and growth of our economy. That meant we had
to provide a new nominal anchor. We chose inflation targeting, given the
unreliable nature of running monetary policy with money aggregates. In-
flation targeting goes beyond just having a target for inflation. We think
about it almost as a ritual, a routine, a methodical pursuit of a transparent
goal, along the lines discussed by Mishkin in his book with Bernanke and
coauthors (Bernanke et al. 1999). Inflation targeting requires explaining
very carefully and on a timely basis what the central bank does and having
long-term objectives to avoid the typical time-consistency problems. It is in-
teresting to note that, as it relates to the exchange rate, inflation targeting
introduces an automatic response to volatility. For example, a depreciation
of the exchange rate increases expected inflation, and, ceteris paribus, in-
duces a tighter monetary policy (a form of automatic leaning against the
wind).
Second—and here I’d like to make one brief point—when we talk about
fixed exchange rates, we tend to say that, in order to support the fixed ex-
change rate, we need a very strong fiscal regime, very strong banking, and
so on, as if we didn’t need them with a float. There is no real diﬀerence, how-
ever. Both regimes do well or not depending on the consistency of the over-
all conduct of macroeconomic policy. For instance, with a weak fiscal
regime, I do not think one can run a proper floating exchange rate either.
Oftentimes we heard in the political debate back home that floating was a
way to run a looser budget. That is just not the case. Indeed, I believe the
key factor behind Brazil’s recent recovery was the fiscal turnaround that ac-
tually started before the crisis and luckily has stayed in place and is being
deepened as we move along.
Another issue worth mentioning here belongs to the micro side. In striv-
Exchange Rate Regimes 83
ing to avoid recurrent crises we must be very careful to design policies that
are volatility-reducing rather than volatility-suppressing policies, and this is
a concept that I heard first from Carlos Massad, my counterpart in Chile,
in a recent seminar at the Bank of England. I like that definition: you want
to do things that help you reduce and not hide volatility. Here the sequenc-
ing of policies and reforms plays a key role. It is important to strengthen the
prudential regime before liberalizing the financial sector. We started the
process in Brazil with new provisioning rules, new accounting rules, the in-
troduction of market risk as part of capital requirements, and so on. I won’t
go into detail.
Just to conclude, let me note that since the floating of the real in the cri-
sis of early 1999 we are often asked whether we are afraid of floating. The
answer to that is clear when we look at the data: interest rate volatility has
declined and exchange rate volatility has increased substantially since the
floating, reaching levels similar to those found in countries that tradition-
ally float.
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4. Jacob A. Frenkel
I’d like to join the previous speakers in thanking and complementing Se-
bastian Edwards on his paper on exchange rates and exchange rate systems
in the context of risk avoidance and risk management. Of course, the issue
of exchange rates and exchange rate regimes, or monetary policy and its im-
plications for exchange rates, is not a new one. As a matter of fact, looking
back at the programs of the American Economic Association for the past
twenty years, there was not a single year without a session on these issues.
Nevertheless we come back to them, not because we did not have answers,
but because the answers change. The answers change, of course, because the
circumstances change. Several key concepts that will come up in the dis-
cussion today were completely absent in the past. Therefore, our attitude is
indeed legitimately changing. Notions of capital flows as being the sine qua
non within which we have to discuss these issues simply did not exist. Cred-
ibility, balance sheet tests, the issue of pricing of risks, moral hazards, dis-
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tinction between nominal and real exchange rates, the role of short-run ver-
sus long-run when time is moving relatively fast, and so on—obviously,
once those issues are on the table, our approach to exchange rate analysis
diﬀers. Let me cover several basic points here.
First, in the context of this new reality, which you can call “globalization”
or “integrated capital markets,” what are the implications for issues that
were at the fore just a few years ago: intervention policies, stabilization poli-
cies, pass-through from exchange rates to prices, and Phillips-curve rela-
tionships and their relationship to exchange rate systems? Let me begin by
saying that I truly believe that the issue of “corners” is a complex one. Be-
cause we all live in the intermediate period, an intermediate regime should
be all right. However, if there is anything that capital market integration
shows us, it is that what we thought was a very simple mechanism of being
an in-between regime, having neither clean float nor fully fixed rates, is
much more complicated. It is also likely to be much less attractive.
At the end of the day, one needs to gravitate to one of those extremes.
Look at my own country’s experience. I don’t think there is a single ex-
change rate regime that Israel did not go through. It had a peg to the dollar,
a peg to the basket, a horizontal band, a sloped band, a widening slope, a
parallel-to-boundaries band, and a nonparallel-to-boundaries band. If one
needed a lesson, or an example, of a case in which there is no single ex-
change rate regime that is the cure for all ills, that’s a good one. However, are
there some key lessons that have been learned?
In terms of the fear of floating that Edwards speaks about: in Israel, there
was a new government in 1977 that thought it had to liberalize everything.
Indeed, overnight there was a complete liberalization of the foreign ex-
change markets, and within a very short period of time the seeds of hyper-
inflation were sown. We had a stable economy; still, the movement was to-
ward hyperinflation in 1985. Paradoxically, or interestingly enough, it
ended because of an exchange rate anchor. The question was, why did the
regime fail? The answer is that it jumped from a plane without a parachute.
The parachute, in this context, is the creation of markets. I believe it is not
a question of which exchange rate policy or which exchange rate regime one
has, but rather whether one has the necessary institutional setting. And I
think that is a major lesson. One must have a well-functioning market to al-
low the luxury of choosing the best regime. This particular episode in Israel
created a twenty-year drama that had to be resolved only in a much later stage
when practical floating came into being. When you deal within a political mi-
lieu, occasionally you must introduce measures of progress very gradually.
Unless, of course, you are pushed into change by crisis. In Israel, we intro-
duced a band, and the band was upward sloping, and we gradually removed
foreign exchange controls. Unless you remove foreign exchange controls, you
must have “wider roads,” because you are allowing faster traﬃc. Therefore,
there was in fact a formal link between exchange rate variability that was al-
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lowed by the regime and the openness of the capital account. As you open
the capital account, you must allow larger variability of exchange rates to
become an integral part of the system. However, if you have larger variabil-
ity of exchange rates, and you need to avoid the cost of variability, then it
becomes essential to develop the market mechanisms and the instruments
that are capable of dealing with such variability. Thus the distinction be-
tween suppressed volatility and reduced volatility comes into being. You
need to actually price volatility properly. So, at least in our context, it be-
comes an integral part of financial market developments, rather than ex-
change rate policies.
But then, what does monetary policy do? Here I think that, within the
framework of having the tendency toward less schizophrenic monetary au-
thorities all over the world, that is, a much crisper target or objective, we
adopt inflation targeting. Once you adopt inflation targeting, however, it is
much simpler and almost necessary to have more flexibility in exchange
rates. Here perhaps there is a distinction between countries that come into
the game from a legacy of less credible financial systems and monetary pol-
icy and countries, like the industrial countries, that have had a lot of credi-
bility. A nominal anchor does not have to be tested by actually stopping the
boat.
Rather, you can ask: could I lift the anchor when I need to move the boat?
As you introduce the anchor, as we did in the stabilization program in the
shape of a nominal exchange rate anchor, the key question is what happens
when you lift the anchor? Does it mean a collapse of stability? Or does it
mean a graduation in stability that allows you to lift the anchor and go to
the open sea? Indeed, once you have inflation targeting, you are much
clearer in the domestic political debate about your responsibilities. You are
not in charge of fixing the competitiveness of the export sector. And that’s
key, because time and again, monetary authorities that have not been fully
independent—not in the legal sense but in the practical sense—have been
put under tremendous pressure from interest groups within the industrial
sector or the political sector, all of them pointing to the lack of competi-
tiveness. Real exchange rate changes, and hence monetary policy, can aﬀect
nominal exchange rates. Ergo, it becomes the responsibility of the Central
Bank to deal with competitiveness. Thus there are multiple implicit objec-
tives, and none of them is achieved.
I think that once you are inflation targeting, this is the true anchor, be-
cause you operate through expectations. And if you operate through ex-
pectations, if you have credible inflation targeting, you can allow the ex-
change rate to be determined at the correct level. The responsibility for its
value also rests in the market, which is where it belongs. I would say that the
ability to achieve sustainable disinflation, or maintenance of low inflation,
in countries with legacies like those of which we have been speaking, rests
on ensuring that the Central Bank can focus on what it does best.
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I notice in Domingo Cavallo’s remarks something very interesting—a
new twist, as far as I can see. In the world of two corners, which says that
you have either completely fixed (meaning “throw away the key” and adopt
foreign currency, or the equivalent thereof) or completely floating, you ap-
pear to have a symmetric choice. For Cavallo, though, what is truly the
long-run state is flexibility. You must first gain entry into the Darwinian
competition by having credibility acquired through long-term price stabil-
ity. If it is acquired through currency purchases, so be it. However, when the
purchased currency moves into a flexible rate regime, this is not a collapse
but, rather, a graduation. And I think that lifting the anchor is part of the
anchor strategy. If you don’t have a very well defined mechanism to lift the
anchor without losing credibility, you had better not start using the anchor
but, instead, leave it wherever it belongs.
On capital controls, Edwards has made some remarks, talking a bit about
the Chilean experience. It is no accident that the Chilean experience is al-
ways mentioned, because it failed dramatically in many, many cases. At
least in Israel’s case, where we tried to impose capital controls, we learned
very well that “water seeps through the cracks.” You really cannot have
long-term capital controls.
Let me mention here the moral hazard problem. When a government is
committing itself to a nominal exchange rate—that is, pegging—it enters
into an implicit contract with the industrial sector. And many, many times,
when we need to change the peg, we again face the industry saying, “you
broke the rules of the game. We planned according to what you promised
us, and now you’re changing the exchange rate.” Obviously, this means that
if an exchange rate needs to be changed, it always will have to be a little later
than when it is required; and if it is a little later, then we are back to the prob-
lems that were mentioned earlier.
The same is true for intervention. In order to succeed with intervention,
you had better be able to stabilize. In order to succeed with stabilization,
you had better be able to manage the quantities at hand. If indeed the envi-
ronment is an open capital account, there is simply no way that you can do
it successfully. I remember very well the 1998 crisis, when the appetite for in-
vestment in emerging markets declined after Russia and other problems:
everyone wanted to cash in their emerging markets holdings. Suddenly, on
the same day, all finance ministers and governors in practically all emerging
markets felt the same mechanism: investors wanted to cash out and leave
the country with the pressures of the foreign exchange market. Basically, we
had three choices. One was to intervene and prevent the exchange rate
changes that were actually about to occur. Another was to close the win-
dow: put in capital controls or something of that type. Third, we could al-
low the exchange rate to adjust, not because we loved that option, but be-
cause we had no other choice but to use monetary policy very fiercely in
order to deal with the inflationary consequences of the exchange rate
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change. The reality was that when the exchange rate depreciated, we noticed
what the inflationary consequences were likely to be. That’s when we raised
interest rates. That’s when we ended up with this type of scenario. What was
the outcome? We raised interest rates quite dramatically, and within an ex-
tremely short period of time—we are talking about weeks—the process re-
versed itself, and someone looking before and after could not see the diﬀer-
ence. As a matter of fact, exactly in the period when emerging markets
contemplated imposing controls, we publicly eliminated the final traces of
controls, making the point that, indeed, our markets are open. Indeed, it
was no accident that when money left emerging markets, it came to us. But
we were emerging markets, and therefore we realized that the concept called
“emerging markets,” which is based on a color-blind investor, is also part of
the past. The countries are involved in beauty contests, and selectivity is the
name of the game. It is not the exchange rate regime that will carry the day
in these beauty contests, but rather the ability to carry out the right eco-
nomic policies.
What did we see at the end of the day? We saw that the Phillips curve can
be positively sloped, that inflation is now holding solidly enough for two
years in a row at the range of 1.5 percent. Growth this year is about 6 per-
cent, and basically this is the payoﬀ for the period of slow growth from be-
fore. The fact is, however, that the credibility of monetary policy has been
enhanced very strongly. Now you can say, well, that’s an esoteric objective
for a monetary policymaker, to have credibility. But that’s not true, because
with this enhanced credibility, the credibility of the inflation-targeting strat-
egy also has been enhanced, and thus the pass-through from exchange rates
to prices disappears. In the past, countries with inflationary legacies knew
that whenever the exchange rate changes by 5 percent, prices at home would
change by 5 percent immediately. And because you know that will happen,
the markup occurs instantaneously, and that is basically the self-defeating
mechanism of “flexible exchange rates.” However, in the inflation-targeting
approach, the monetary authorities have the credibility that they will not al-
low the inflation consequences of the exchange rate to take place, because
they use interest rates properly. Then there is no reason that when the ex-
change rate changes, one is wiped out from its real implications of infla-
tionary changes. This is the case because the inflation will not take place,
since everyone knows that it will not be allowed. Therefore, what we have
noticed is that when there was a depreciation of the currency, it did not
mark the start of inflation and real exchange rate changes, but, rather, it
marked the start of improved competitiveness. Suddenly, in this regard,
what you observe is that the disinflation process has been accompanied by
enhanced rather than declining competitiveness.
Let me conclude by noting one more general statement: If the environ-
ment within which we operate is one of capital markets that are integrated,
then one implication is that time passes very quickly because this mecha-
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nism enables what one anticipates will happen tomorrow to instead happen
today through the capital markets. This means that the distinction between
short run and long run is getting blurred; all the policy debates and justifi-
cations for short-run policies that are not sustainable in the long run can-
not stand any more, because the long run is much closer than it used to be.
Thus, we have stabilization policies that are not sustainable in the long run
and should not be started in the short run. So, although I am not dogmatic
about the notion of a “don’t be in-between regime,” because I realize that
you cannot jump to a corner in one day, I do say that it is important to no-
tice where are you going to gravitate, and to recognize that this is a gradu-
ation from where you are now; and if it is a graduation, then the movement
is not reflecting a collapse and loss of credibility but, rather, progress and a
gain in credibility.
Discussion Summary
Guillermo Ortiz began on the theme of whether floating rate regimes are fea-
sible for emerging markets. He recalled that when Mexico began floating in
1995 it was not because the government had studied exchange rate models
and decided that the optimum regime was a float. Instead, the country had
completely run out of reserves and had no choice but to let the exchange
rate go. At the time he felt a float was not a feasible long-term policy. In his
capacity as minister for finance he wrote a blueprint for economic policy in
early 1995 called the National Development Plan. This plan stated the in-
tention to return to a more predictable exchange rate regime once enough
reserves had been accumulated.
Why was the government so afraid the float would not function well? Or-
tiz said that they had no prior experience with floating and believed that the
exchange rate would be unstable. Mexico lacked institutional prerequisites
such as a futures market and the capacity to conduct an independent mon-
etary policy. The actual experience has been much more positive than ex-
pected, however. First, futures markets have been established domestically
and in Chicago, and the volatility of the exchange rate has been comparable
to the experience of other floaters. Second, the rate has also changed the
composition of capital flows, with 80 percent now being foreign direct in-
vestment and 20 percent portfolio investment—the reverse proportions of
what Mexico had before. Third, it has allowed Mexico to grow at an aver-
age of 5.5 percent in the five years after the crisis. He said he is now “fully
converted to this world of floating rates.”
Ortiz then turned to the question of whether Mexico is “really floating.”
To provide an answer, he suggested that we look at how Mexico is conduct-
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ing monetary policy. Mexico adopted inflation targeting in 1998. He said
that the authorities are constantly grappling with the “leaning against the
wind” problem posed by Arminio Fraga. He concluded, however, “that the
real object of the Central Bank is to get inflation down,” adding that in do-
ing so “we do look at exchange rates but we don’t worry too much about ex-
change rates.”
Continuing on the theme of “fear of floating,” Ortiz drew a distinction
between fear of volatility and fear of misalignment. He said, “volatility is
something we can live with,” adding that the authorities should pursue poli-
cies that reduce volatility, not policies that suppress it. On the misalignment
question, he said you must believe in the market to align a misaligned ex-
change rate.
Sounding a more negative note on freely floating exchange rates, Paul
Volcker observed that in an integrated capital market the foreign exchange
market responds like an asset market, and asset markets are inherently
volatile. Volcker said he is not too concerned about day-to-day or month-
to-month volatility, but about something that comes close to what Ortiz
called misalignment. He pointed out that the major economies had “mis-
alignments” of 50 percent running over periods of a couple of years under
floating rates. Volcker asked if this is consistent with the eﬃcient interna-
tional division of labor that we learn about in the textbooks. He said that we
learn about the importance of prices and comparative advantage, but when
we see the exchange rate move by 50 percent over two or three years, we say,
“who cares?” Whatever the impact on large economies, Volcker thinks that
such volatility has a big impact on smaller economies. Close to 90 percent
of transactions take place with a fixed exchange rate in large economies
such the United States and Euroland. Smaller, more internationally open
economies are much more exposed.
Turning to what to do about this volatility, Volcker said that if you are go-
ing to have open capital markets, the ultimate logic of an eﬃcient interna-
tional system is a single currency, but he added that he doesn’t expect to see
this in his lifetime. Regarding the small emerging market economies, he
asked if there are intermediate approaches. He recalled Arminio Fraga’s
point about confusion under pegged rates, adding, “you can’t be any more
confused than me about the current floating regime.” Addressing Guil-
lermo Ortiz, Volcker pointed out that although the Mexican government
might be happy with the floating peso, Mexican businessmen say they want
him to convince the Mexican government to adopt the dollar to bring about
some certainty.
Volcker finished with the stark prediction that Mexico will adopt the dol-
lar after one more big currency crisis, adding that he is “convinced that
within a decade we will have such a crisis, judging from experience.” Sebas-
tian Edwards said that Mexico will adopt the dollar when it becomes truly
integrated with the United States, and he joked that that will not happen be-
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fore the United States has at least one major league baseball team operat-
ing in Mexico. Volcker noted after the meeting that he had been working to-
ward precisely that aim with the commissioner of major league baseball!
Takatoshi Ito commented on the debate going on in Asia about the ap-
propriate exchange rate regime now that there has been a successful recov-
ery from the crisis and foreign reserves have been built back up. He added
that there is some indication that Asian economies are again pegging to the
dollar. They are going back to a de facto dollar peg that many consider to
have been mistaken. As an alternative, he said, “many of us” are advocat-
ing an intermediate regime for Asia, especially the basket band crawl (BBC)
proposed by John Williamson. The basket idea makes sense because of
Asia’s diversified trade structure. The proposal is to give one-fourth weight
to Japan, one-fourth to the United States, less than one-fourth to Europe,
and slightly more than one-fourth to neighboring non-Japan countries. The
band and crawl are needed to have the flexibility to respond to supply
shocks. Ito pointed out one problem with getting such a regime established:
if your neighbor is adopting a de facto dollar peg, you will want to do like-
wise, given the strong trade links with neighboring countries. For this rea-
son there has to be a joint decision to adopt the basket system, Ito said.
On the issue of confusion and temptation in intermediate rate systems,
Ito said that Asian countries did not have the hyperinflationary experience
suﬀered elsewhere. Thus, even after the crisis the populations have more
confidence in their central banks. Temptation can be controlled by Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) surveillance and peer pressures within the
region. Ito concluded by saying that the details of intermediate regimes
should be explored rather than dismissed out of hand.
In response to a request for clarification, Ito agreed that this proposal was
for Asian countries other than Japan.
Lin See Yan addressed what he regarded as the unfair treatment of
Malaysia as a pariah following its imposition of selected capital exchange
controls. The Malaysian case must be viewed in the context of its critical
need to maintain stable growth with equity, given the vast diﬀerences in
race, culture, religion, language, occupation by race, and economic status
of its diverse population. To keep racial, social, and religious tensions at
bay, “the economic pie” has to grow in a sustainable fashion, he said.
Malaysia has been remarkably stable following this strategy for the past
thirty years. In the early months, things even looked good as the crisis per-
sisted. The managing director of the IMF praised Malaysia’s management
of the economy shortly before and for months after the crisis. Once the con-
trols were instituted, Lin complained, he was saying that Malaysia was the
worst country in the world. Lin went on to describe the devastating impact
of sharp exchange rate volatility, large outflows of portfolio capital, and the
exceptionally deep fall in stock market prices on businesses and expecta-
tions in a small open economy such as Malaysia. Not even a reasonably well
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managed and well structured economy like Malaysia could withstand,
within a very short period of crisis, a 40 percent devaluation of its currency
and a 60 percent diminution of its stock market capitalization at a time
when the region was engulfed in panic, euphoria, and contagion, without
any reasonable prospect of an early recovery. He concluded by saying that
the adoption of a reasonable exchange rate regime for any economy must
take account of its specific circumstances, in particular the political and so-
cial mission of public policy. With hindsight, timely intervention to reestab-
lish stability enabled Malaysia to avoid the political and social unrest expe-
rienced by the other crisis-aﬀected nations, notably Indonesia.
Jeﬀrey Frankel observed that it is remarkable how the “corners hypothe-
sis” has become conventional wisdom five years after if was first proposed
following the exchange rate mechanism crisis. What is especially remark-
able, he said, is that it has become so widespread without much of a theo-
retical justification. Various justifications have been mentioned—the im-
possible trinity, the danger of unhedged dollar liabilities, procrastinating on
exit, and the diﬃculties of transparency and verifiability. However, if you
look at each of these in detail, none of them can be written down in a model
with the result that you want to go to either a firm-fixed or freely floating
corner. Frankel added that each captures a diﬃcult trade-oﬀ, but the trade-
oﬀ does not go away when you go to a corner.
Sebastian Edwards commented on the diﬃculty of measuring exchange
rate misalignment. He pointed out the large diﬀerences that exist between
the major financial institutions’—Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and
Deutsche Bank—estimates of misalignments in Latin American economies
in early 2000. The models, he concludes, need to be improved. Regarding
the debate about the corners hypothesis, he said he agrees with Frankel that
it is amazing how popular it has become with essentially no model. As a
profession, we have ruled out the middle because it has not worked well in
the last five years, without taking a longer historical perspective. Edwards
also thinks that we are being naïve about the political diﬃculties of going to
either of the two corners. Most countries will be in the middle, and so, from
a technical point of view, we must work on rules to make managed regimes
less prone to crisis.
Arminio Fraga predicted that there will be gravitation to the extremes.
Based on what he has heard about the Asian experience, he concludes that
it takes a lot of virtue to run an intermediate regime. It can be done, he said,
but it is risky. He prefers systems that are less demanding of virtue.
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